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Executive Summary 
 
 
1. The ratification of New START and its subsequent entry into force have raised expectations that 
the momentum generated would be maintained and result in even deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals 
than anticipated by the treaty itself. It also raised hopes that next steps towards nuclear disarma-
ment would entail limitations and reductions of tactical (non-strategic or sub-strategic) nuclear 
weapons (TNW). 
This prospect should not be taken for granted, however. The resolutions and statements that ac-
companied the ratification point rather in different directions. While the US Senate committed the 
President to seek an agreement on TNW in order to address the disparity in favour of Russia, the 
State Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament, reiterated the demand that the US with-
draws all TNW to its national territory and eliminates the infrastructure for their forward deploy-
ment in Europe. 
While the US government has expressed its intention to include TNW on the agenda of follow-on 
talks, and while NATO called upon Russia, in November 2010, to relocate nuclear weapons away 
from the territory of the Alliance’s member states, Moscow remains hesitant to commit itself to any 
immediate subsequent measures. 
 
2. The US and Russia maintain a legally binding commitment to nuclear disarmament. They sub-
scribed to this ultimate goal in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and have repeat-
edly reconfirmed their obligation. They did so most recently at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. 
This commitment covers TNW no less than any other nuclear weapons, although it does so in a 
general way without specifying when and how these weapons should be reduced and eliminated. 
The concept of TNW encompasses all nuclear weapons not covered by US-Russian nuclear arms 
control treaties – those governing reductions of strategic offensive arms (START) and the elimina-
tion of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF). 
Although TNW are not covered by existing treaties, the US and Russia have significantly reduced 
their stockpiles over the past twenty years on the basis of parallel unilateral measures announced in 
1991 and 1992. The remaining weapons are no longer operatively deployed and are stored sepa-
rately from delivery systems. After those reductions, Russia still maintains a more sizeable and di-
verse arsenal of TNW than the US does. It is expected to be reduced further, however, with or 
without an agreement. 
The concept of TNW thus includes non-deployed nuclear munitions (warheads) in nuclear storage 
facilities. It does not include TNW delivery systems (platforms) that are also assigned for conven-
tional missions. 
 
3. Notwithstanding the fact that TNW are no longer operatively deployed, concerns about them 
have continuously been raised, particularly with regard to nuclear munitions stored in the proximity 
of their delivery vehicles, which would thus be available for early deployment. Such concerns were 
largely fed by the lack of transparency with regard to the actual numbers of remaining TNW, their 
storage locations and deployment status. 
TNW are also considered to be more vulnerable to theft or the risk of unauthorized use than strate-
gic nuclear weapons. 
The evolution of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation discourse since the 
late 1990s, and particularly more recently in the context of the Global Zero debate, has largely con-
tributed to elevating the TNW issue to the top of the nuclear disarmament agenda. 
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4. Moscow has a long record of championing the extension of arms control measures to TNW. 
Over the past decade and a half, however, it became increasingly hesitant to engage in talks ad-
dressing this category of weapons. Russia’s reluctance has two main reasons – its increasing reli-
ance on nuclear weapons in its defence posture against the background of the evolving strategic 
landscape, and the challenging complexity and sensitivity of verifiably monitoring non-deployed 
nuclear munitions. 
 
5. Confronted with a declining conventional defence capability and a growing gap in advanced 
military capabilities, since the end of the Cold War, Russia has tended to rely increasingly on nu-
clear arms to offset its inferiority vis-à-vis more advanced military powers, particularly the US. In 
this context, TNW are seen as a means of deterring, terminating or even defeating not only a nu-
clear attack but also a conventional attack that exceeds Russia’s conventional capability. 
Russian defence analysts anticipate that the continued introduction of advanced conventional and 
non-conventional weapons technologies by major military powers will result in further increasing 
the role of nuclear weapons in the Russian defence posture. Although the reliance on TNW is con-
sidered to be of a temporary nature – until Russia has matched the advanced military powers or un-
til the latter have agreed to limit their advanced military capabilities via arms control instruments – 
this general trend is expected to have a long-term effect on Russia’s defence posture. 
This is one reason why, under current circumstances, most Russian experts, and particularly the de-
fence and the nuclear defence industrial establishments, are proceeding on the presumption that in-
cluding TNW in arms control measures is not in the interest of Russia. Furthermore, there are vir-
tually no significant Russian constituencies with a vested interest in reducing or limiting TNW. 
This does not mean that Russia’s existing TNW stockpile will not be reduced further. However, 
any reductions of this kind are more likely to happen unilaterally rather than on the basis of an in-
ternational agreement. 
 
6. This is also due to the fact that any internationally verifiable reductions of TNW represent an ex-
tremely challenging task. Such measures would require parties to open their nuclear depots for in-
trusive inspections of stored warheads. Since this is considered to be a very sensitive issue of na-
tional security, the introduction of the relevant measures requires an unprecedented level of mutual 
trust, which can hardly be presumed given the current state of Russo-US and Russo-Western rela-
tions. 
It is worth noting that the most advanced cooperation between the US and Russia in exploring 
means for reliably monitoring the elimination of nuclear warheads and the disposal of fissile mate-
rial, as well as information exchange with NATO concerning TNW reductions were terminated in 
the late 1990s after becoming hostage to mounting tensions in relations between Russia and the 
West. 
 
7. Although Moscow has strong reservations, it is not entirely impossible that it will consent to talk 
about TNW. However, this challenging and time-consuming endeavour would require progress in 
other areas of arms control and is unlikely to yield tangible results any time soon. Its success would 
largely depend on whether Russian concerns that have been raised over the past decade are heard 
and acted upon. 
Moscow no longer concentrates only on nuclear balance with the US or third nuclear powers. Apart 
from the conventional disparities that emerged in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the eastward extension of NATO, it includes in its strategic calculation advanced military capabili-
ties, such as precision-guided munitions (PGMs), ballistic missile defence, long range convention-
ally armed weapons that can be assigned strategic goals, and the possibility of the weaponization of 
outer space. 
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Responding to the West’s argument based on the disparity in TNW, Moscow points to asymmetries 
in other areas and finds it difficult to single out one specific asymmetry without addressing others 
in a comprehensive manner. 
The Russian defence establishment anticipates that uncertainties in the evolution of Russia’s strate-
gic environment shaped by the development of advanced military capabilities, risks of nuclear pro-
liferation in the proximity of Russia’s borders and local and regional conflicts are unlikely to van-
ish in the next ten years during the lifetime of the New START treaty. It proceeds on the basis that 
the treaty is well designed to govern the US-Russian strategic relationship during this period but, 
being confronted with diverse scenarios regarding the future evolution of the strategic landscape, 
prefers to keep all options for the maintenance and the development of Russian nuclear capabilities 
open. 
 
8. Should the US and Russia still decide to address TNW in their talks or consultations, they are 
most likely to do so on a bilateral basis, without involving, at least not at this early stage, any third 
parties. 
The political constraints and challenging nature of TNW arms control make a gradualist approach 
more plausible than anticipating a comprehensive treaty providing for verifiable reductions to be 
negotiated in the near future. A gradualist approach would depart from making stockpiles, deploy-
ment status and, probably, storage locations of TNW more transparent by means of information ex-
change, while keeping the door open for step-by-step progress in introducing appropriate arms con-
trol measures. 
 
– The US and Russia can begin by disclosing the quantity of deployable TNW (and strategic 
weapons) in their reserves and exchanging information on the number of strategic weapons 
and TNW destroyed since the early 1990s. They could also resume and expand the exchange 
of information on the implementation of the unilateral measures of 1991 and 1992. 
 
– The NATO-Russia Council may provide a platform for multilateral consultations and reassur-
ing information exchange, the discussion of nuclear postures, for updating Russia on the status 
of the intra-NATO consultations concerning the future of US nuclear assets in Europe and for 
the development of cooperative confidence-building measures. 
 
– Measures based on geography, such as the introduction of “exclusion zones” adjacent to 
NATO-Russia or EU-Russia borders in which TNW should be neither deployed nor stored, 
appear impractical. 
It is not clear how far Moscow is supposed to move its weapons in order to keep them away, 
in a reassuring manner, from the territory of NATO and EU member states. TNW delivery 
systems have different ranges with some of them being able to reach EU/NATO territory from 
well beyond the Urals. Most TNW delivery systems are mobile and can be forward deployed 
regardless of where they are usually deployed and where the relevant munitions are stored. 
All or most Russian TNW are reportedly kept together with strategic weapons in central stor-
age facilities, i.e. in depots controlled by the Ministry of Defence rather than at air or naval 
bases. Many of those facilities are reportedly located in the proximity of Russia’s borders with 
EU/NATO countries. This makes the introduction of “exclusion zones” unverifiable unless all 
Russian nuclear storage facilities are moved to the Far Eastern part of Russia. 
Needless to say that a demand that all Russian TNW be moved sufficiently far from 
EU/NATO borders that does not even touch on the issue of US and other NATO countries’ 
TNW in Europe is unlikely to be appreciated in Moscow. 
 
– Consolidating all TNW in central storage facilities regardless of their geographic location, 
however, could provide for a reasonable alternative to establishing geographic “exclusion 
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zones” by prohibiting the storage of TNW at air and naval bases, i.e. close the their delivery 
systems, which would also provide additional remedies to prevent the theft or unauthorized 
use of TNW. 
 
– In the longer term, seeking verifiable reductions of TNW and non-deployed strategic weapons, 
as currently envisaged by the US government, could build upon the experiences jointly gath-
ered by the US and Russian nuclear scientists in the late 1990s who, in what became known as 
a “lab-to-lab” dialogue, explored practical methods allowing the verification of the disman-
tlement, storage, transportation and disassembly of nuclear warheads as well as the disposal of 
fissile material in a non-intrusive but reassuring way. 
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Introduction 
 
 
For the purposes of this study, the concept of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), often also referred 
to as non-strategic or sub-strategic nuclear weapons, includes all types of nuclear weapons not cov-
ered by the US-Russian Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction and Limitation Treaty (START) and 
the 1987 Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.1
The political and public debate over TNW has flourished over the past few years. This develop-
ment was largely facilitated by the advance of the Global Zero campaign, which raised the question 
of a phased elimination of both strategic weapons and TNW, as well as by the revival of arms con-
trol as a topic in US-Russian relations, and particularly by the successful negotiation and the subse-
quent ratification of the New START treaty. 
 Furthermore, whenever 
the concept of TNW is used in this study it means nuclear weapons (warheads) as opposed to their 
delivery systems. 
The recent resumption of nuclear arms control raised expectations of its eventual extension to 
TNW – the single category of nuclear weapons not covered by any agreement except for a series of 
unilateral parallel measures initiated by the Presidents of the United States, the Soviet Union and 
the Russian Federation in 1991 and 1992, known as Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). These 
expectations materialized in a series of recent initiatives. 
In February 2010, the need to address TNW in Europe was raised by the foreign ministers of Swe-
den and Poland. Ever since, the two ministers have promoted an arrangement that would commit 
Moscow to withdraw its TNW from – i.e. not to deploy or store them in – areas adjacent to the EU 
borders, particularly the Kola Peninsula and the Kaliningrad region. This initiative found a positive 
response in a number of other countries. 
Following the 2009 debate on whether to include TNW on the agenda of the New START talks or 
not, the US government indicated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that it would seek to address 
the issue in the follow-up negotiations to START.2 The need to ensure security, transparency and 
verifiable reductions of TNW was an important issue during the New START ratification debates 
in the US Senate.3
In November 2010, the desire “to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear 
weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members” found 
its way into the new NATO strategic concept, which also called for further steps to “take into ac-
count the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons”.
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In 2010, initiatives were put forward within NATO suggesting that the US should withdraw its re-
maining TNW from Europe. Although the Alliance remained divided on this issue as well as on the 
matter of the future of the US extended deterrence policy, the withdrawal option gathered strong 
support within the US government and in many European capitals. 
 
This recent burgeoning of debate over TNW echoes the discussions of early 1990s that followed 
the transfer of large numbers of TNW to Russia, first from the former Warsaw Pact countries, and 
                                                     
1  On the question of what TNW are and what they are not see, e.g., Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton, Russia’s 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Part I: Background and Policy Issues, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 
2003, pp. 9-11; Anatoli Diakov, Eugene Myasnikov and Timur Kadyshev, Non-strategic nuclear weapons: Prob-
lems of control and reduction, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies of the Moscow Institute 
of Physics and Technology, Dolgoprudny, 2004, pp. 7-10; Miles A. Pomper, William Potter and Nikolai Sokov, 
Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe, The James Martin Center for Non-
proliferation Studies, Monterey, 2009, p. 9; Alexei Arbatov, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, in: NATO-Russia 
Relations (Prospects for New Security Architecture, Nuclear Reductions, CFE Treaty), IMEMO RAN, Moscow, 
2010, p. 29.  
2  Nuclear Posture Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., April 2010, pp. xi, 47. 
3  See: 111th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, Exec, Rept. 111-6, Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduc-
tion and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (The New START Treaty), October 1, 2010. 
4  “Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” 
Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, pp. 7-8. 
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then from other once constituent parts of the disintegrating former Soviet Union. At precisely this 
moment in time, the PNIs aimed at increasing the safety and security of the TNW transported to 
and stored in Russia. 
Particularly from 2000, the issue of TNW figured prominently on the agenda of Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conferences. The most recent Conference of 2010 reaffirmed 
the commitment by the nuclear-weapon states “to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nu-
clear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and 
multilateral measures”, and called upon those states “to promptly engage with a view to […] ad-
dress the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location” (emphasis 
added).5
Over all those years, concerns were continuously raised with regard to TNW despite the fact that, 
reportedly, most or all those weapons are no longer operatively deployed but are kept in special de-
pots separate from their delivery systems. Those concerns are largely fed by “the absence of any 
degree of transparency with regard to warheads that are stored adjacent to delivery vehicles” and 
thus are available for relatively early deployment. This is supposed to foster “crisis instability be-
cause each party could expand its nuclear arsenal on short notice without the knowledge of the 
other”.
 
6
Apart from any crisis stability considerations, TNW are usually considered to be more vulnerable 
to theft and the risk of unauthorized launch than strategic weapons. 
 
Moscow has a long record of championing arms control solutions aimed particularly at this class of 
nuclear weapons. Starting in the 1970s, it repeatedly insisted on including US TNW in Europe and 
in the Pacific in the strategic arms limitations (SALT) and reductions (START) frameworks. Early 
in the 1990s, the Russian government promoted the idea of converting the 1991-92 PNIs into a le-
gally binding instrument. 
Those efforts failed for multiple reasons. During the Cold War, the US showed little interest in in-
cluding TNW in arms control arrangements, since it saw them as compensation for Soviet conven-
tional superiority in Europe. It would not be wrong to assume that the 1991 decision by the United 
States to withdraw almost all TNW to its territory and to subsequently eliminate most of them was 
made much easier by the signing, in 1990, of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE), which envisaged the elimination of the conventional disparities. 
The US never felt particularly threatened by Russian TNW. In the 1990s, it appeared more con-
cerned with the security of the latter’s storage and transportation than with their verified reduction. 
It would not be fair, however, to blame only the US for earlier failures to address the issue. They 
were no less due to the complexity of the problem which, in contrast to “strategic” arms, implied 
verifiable reductions of warheads rather than of delivery vehicles.7
Over time, Russia, the US and NATO changed roles. Moscow became sceptical, to say the least, 
with regard to including TNW within an arms control regime. Russia is no less (and no more) le-
gally bound than the US or any other nuclear-weapon state by its NPT commitment to nuclear dis-
armament, most recently reconfirmed in 2010 at the Review Conference. This commitment covers 
TNW along with all other nuclear weapons, although it does not specify when and how exactly 
these weapons are to be reduced and eliminated. 
 Neither the US, nor the Soviet 
Union or Russia identified appropriate means to solve this problem. 
Moscow never rejected the prospect of TNW talks, but did formulate preconditions. Its insistence 
on prior withdrawal of American TNW from Europe as well as linkages to a broader set of issues 
                                                     
5  2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Docu-
ment, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), pp. 20-21, available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp? sym-
bol=NPT/CONF.2010/50 (VOL.I) (23/01/2011). 
6  Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear 
Weapons in Europe, p. 9. 
7  Vladimir Belous, Takticheskoe yadernoe oruzhie na rubezhe XXI veka (Tactical nuclear arms at the brink of the 
21st Century), available at http://www.nasledie.ru/voenpol/14_15/article.php?art=3, 17/6/2010.  
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relevant to the maintenance of strategic stability prevented, however, from properly addressing 
concerns raised with regard to TNW. 
In some way, Russian TNW policy is as ambivalent as its policy on Global Zero. In April 2009, re-
sponding to President Obama’s speech in Prague, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev supported 
his pledge for nuclear disarmament. At the same time, he made progress towards this goal condi-
tional upon progress in a number of other areas of arms control.8
In October 2010, the Russian foreign ministry compiled a list of conditions,
 
9
 
 whose fulfilment was 
required to make nuclear disarmament possible. It included: 
– a continuous nuclear disarmament process to gradually include all nuclear weapon-states, 
– the prevention of the weaponization of outer space, 
– abandoning of any nuclear “upload capability”, 
– refraining from deploying conventionally armed long-range systems capable of performing 
strategic missions, 
– refraining from developing strategic missile-defence capabilities without prior coordination 
with affected states, 
– prosecuting any attempts by non-nuclear weapon-states to abuse their participation in the NPT 
for the purposes of developing clandestine military nuclear programs, and removing incentives 
that encourage states to seek to obtain a nuclear capability, 
– refraining, in a verifiable manner, from any increases in conventional capabilities, as well as 
settling existing international disputes including regional conflicts, and 
– ensuring the viability of the cornerstone arms control and non-proliferation instruments.  
 
In other words, from the Russian perspective, further progress in the area of nuclear disarmament is 
conditional upon substantial progress in many other areas of disarmament. 
The first question this study asks is why Moscow has become so reluctant to engage in arms control 
talks over TNW and what developments could encourage it to reconsider this policy. It further asks 
the question of what arms control solutions could be realistically anticipated should such talks be-
gin in the foreseeable future. 
The study opens, in Part I, with an inventory of Russian TNW stockpiles. While acknowledging 
that multiple assessments of the size and composition of those stockpiles vary significantly, it nei-
ther pretends nor intends to produce new evidence. Instead, its objective is to systematize existing 
assessments in order to provide a sufficient background on the subject. 
Given the diversity of TNW it is also important to further differentiate between their various types, 
i.e. between the longer-range or, according to the Russian classification10
In Part II, the study explores the alleged utility of TNW through the prism of the evolution of the 
Russian nuclear posture. While doing so, it pays particular attention to the assessment of the poten-
tial theatres and missions assigned to TNW. 
, the operatively strategic 
and the shorter range tactical or operatively tactical weapons systems. 
                                                     
8  Vystuplenie v universitete Helsinki in otvety na voprosy (Statement in the University of Helsinki and questions and 
answers), 20.4.2009, http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/3805 (23/12/2009). On the Russian debate over Global Zero 
see also: Andrei Zagorski, Global Zero: Eine Utopie oder ein praktisches Ziel der Politik? Zur russischen Debatte 
über Global Zero, in: Reinhard Meier-Walser (ed.), Eine Welt ohne Atomwaffen? „Global Zero“ – Realisierungs-
chancen einer Vision, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, Munich, 2010, pp. 83-93. 
9  O rossiiskikh podkhodakh k probleme yadernogo razoruzheniya (On Russian approaches to the problem of nuclear 
disarmament), a background information available at: http://www.mid.ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/8329e2a2d0f85bdd43256a 
1700419682/77e35c66f48bc072c32577c200342596?OpenDocument (24/12/2010). 
10  V.I. Levshin, A.V. Nedelin, M.E. Sosnovskii, O primenenii yadernogo oruzhiya dlya deeskalatsii voennykh deistvii 
(On the use of nuclear weapons for the purposes of de-escalation of military confrontation), in: Voennaya Mysl’ 
(Military Thought), Moscow, January 1999, available at: http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2449543, 
04/06/2010. 
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In Part III, the study addresses the political aspects shaping Russian approaches to TNW arms con-
trol. While doing so, it seeks to identify incentives and disincentives for Russian decision makers to 
engage in relevant talks. 
In Part IV, the study examines practical aspects of improving transparency and building confidence 
between parties before a tangible result has been achieved in arms control negotiations. It also ad-
dresses challenges to any verifiable agreement on TNW. 
The conclusions summarize the main findings of the preceding analysis as relevant for further dis-
cussion of establishing a TNW arms control regime. 
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Part I. The Inventory of Russian TNW 
 
 
In the PNIs of 1991 and 1992, the US and the Soviet Union followed by the Russian Federation 
unilaterally but reciprocally announced that they would remove their TNW from active service and 
significantly reduce their numbers. TNW were supposed to no longer be operatively deployed. In-
stead, both sides declared they would be moved to storage facilities, while part of them would be 
disassembled and destroyed11
 
. 
In particular, the US declared it would: 
 
– withdraw to its territory and eliminate all TNW for ground forces (land-based missiles and ar-
tillery shells) including those which were deployed in Europe and South Korea, and halt the 
development of a new short-range missile for tactical attack aircraft; 
– remove all and destroy half of naval TNW including nuclear depth bombs for naval land-based 
aviation; 
– reduce the number of US (and UK) nuclear gravity bombs in Europe from 1,400 to 700. 
 
The Soviet Union in 1991 and the Russian Federation in 1992 committed itself to: 
 
– eliminate all TNW for ground force weapons systems (land-based missiles, artillery shells and 
mines); 
– remove all nuclear warheads for antiballistic and air defence to central storage and destroy half 
of them; 
– store all air force TNW in central depots and destroy half of them; 
– remove all TNW from surface ships and submarines and eliminate one-third of them; 
– destroy half of TNW for tactical naval aviation. 
 
Neither Russia nor the US disclosed data on the exact numbers of TNW they had in their posses-
sion at the time the PNIs were announced, let alone providing a breakdown of those numbers into 
more specific categories. Nor do they disclose such information today. However, both have re-
ported and are believed to not only have implemented the PNIs but, also, to have cut their TNW 
stock deeper than it had been envisaged in 1991 and 1992. 
Due to the lack of official comprehensive and verifiable data, the current arsenals of US and Rus-
sian TNW are subject to diverging assessments. The US is supposed to have reduced its stockpile 
from estimated an 11,500 TNW to some 500-800 and has retained only a small nuclear capacity for 
the purposes of forward deployment: the B-61 gravity bombs stored in several countries in Europe, 
and sea launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) for possible deployment in the Pacific region. The latter, 
however, is to be retired under the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, while the gravity bombs, whether 
withdrawn to US territory or not, will be maintained. So will be the nuclear capability of the US 
Air Force when the F-16 is replaced with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.12
Russia is reported to have reduced its TNW stockpile from about 22,000 to some 2,000 deployable 
weapons.
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11  See, e.g., Alexander Pikayev, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, in: Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin (eds), Nuc-
lear Proliferation: New Technologies, Weapons, Treaties, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, 2009, p. 117; Miles 
A. Pomper, William Potter and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons 
in Europe, pp. 5-6. 
 It still maintains not only a larger total stockpile but also a much greater variety of such 
weapons and delivery systems than the US does. Those include a fleet of intermediate-range Tu-
22M aircraft which can carry nuclear gravity bombs and air-to-surface missiles (ASMs); land-
based frontal and naval nuclear-capable aviation for short range ASMs, gravity and depth bombs; 
anti-ship, anti-submarine, air defence nuclear weapons and torpedoes deployable on general pur-
12  Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, pp. xiii, 27-28. 
13  Alexei Arbatov, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, pp. 33-34. 
14 
pose navy surface ships and submarines, as well as SLCMs. Russian TNW continue to include nu-
clear antiballistic and air defence weapons. 
All those weapons are generally believed not to be operatively deployed but to be stored in depots 
except for a few naval missiles and torpedoes loaded on ships and submarines while on sea patrol.14
 
 
 
Assessments of the Russian stockpiles 
 
Since the PNIs were announced, Russian officials have only commented on the process of their im-
plementation in relative terms without providing absolute figures. Reportedly, the US and Russia 
used to update each other on the progress of reductions of TNW and, from 1997, exchanged rele-
vant information within the former NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.15
It is not surprising, therefore, that existing assessments of the Russian stockpile, which all are based 
on indirect methods, are vague and vary significantly. It is even more difficult to disaggregate the 
overall figures in terms of weapons that can be operatively deployed (mated to their delivery sys-
tems) and those held in reserve. The latter category includes weapons stored near the deployed 
forces at an air or naval base, in a central storage facility of the 12th Main Directorate of the Minis-
try of Defence (12th GUMO of the MOD), at an assembly and disassembly site, or in transit be-
tween sites.
 This practice was 
terminated, however, in 1999, in the wake of the Kosovo war and was apparently never resumed. 
16 Reportedly, nuclear weapons move across the country between sites by rail in three 
to four trains a month.17
In order to highlight these differences, Norris and Kristensen differentiate between active deployed 
(operationally deployed), active non-deployed (those that can be fielded quickly to increase the 
number of deployed warheads), and warheads that have been removed from active service and are 
in the process of being fully retired.
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Russian TNW, in accordance with the PNIs, are not supposed to be operatively deployed. They all 
are considered to be – in one state or another – in reserve. For the purposes of this study, we there-
fore differentiate between two categories of weapons: those which remain operative but are kept 
apart from their delivery systems (active non-deployed), and those in reserve. The latter category, 
whenever necessary, can be further disaggregated into weapons in central storage and those stored 
at assembly/disassembly plants. 
 
Current assessments of the overall Russian TNW stockpile summarized in table 1 below range from 
some 2,000 to 8,000 warheads. But the real gap between those assessments is much narrower. 
The figures at the low end of this range (between 2,000 and 3,000 warheads) refer only to the op-
erative (active non-deployed) weapons which can be relatively quickly returned to the forces, while 
the figures at the higher end also include weapons in reserve. 
Despite the inevitable inaccuracies of the existing assessments, it appears realistic to proceed on 
basis of the general assumption that the grand total of the Russian TNW is between 5,000 and 
6,500. While some 2,000 of them are active but non-deployed, the rest remains in reserve. This dif-
ferentiation narrows the gap in the existing assessments, although it is unknown how many of those 
weapons considered to be in reserve are stored at central sites of the 12th GUMO and how many 
await disassembly. 
 
                                                     
14  International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A 
Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers”, Canberra, Tokyo, 2009, p. 21. 
15  Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear 
Weapons in Europe, p. 6. 
16  See, e.g. Gunnar Arbman, Charles Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Part I: Background and Policy 
Issues, p. 8. 
17  Dmitrii Litovkin, Rossia predlagaet kontrolirovat’ yadernye miny (Russia suggests to control nuclear mines), in: 
Izvestiya (Moscow), 4 September 2007. 
18  http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/stockpile_2007-2012.asp (19/09/2010). 
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Table 1: Assessments of the stockpiles of Russian TNW 
 
 
Source 
 
Operative 
 
 
In reserve 
 
Total 
 
National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 2010 
 
 
2,000 
 
3,300 
 
5,390 
International Commission on Nuclear Non-
proliferation and Disarmament, 2009 
 
 
2,000-3 000 
 
3,400 
 
5,400-6,400 
Pomper, Potter, Sokov (CNS), 2009 
 
  5,000-6,700 
SIPRI, 2008 
 
2,100 Several  
thousands 
 
Several  
thousands 
 
Swedish Defence Research Agency (SDRA), 2003 
 
  8,000 
Diakov et al., 2002 
 
3,300-4 000 no data 
 
no data 
 
Sources: Robert S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen, Russian nuclear forces, 2010, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
January/February 2010, pp. 76, 79; International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament 
Report, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers”, p. 20; Miles A. Pomper, 
William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in 
Europe, p. 44; World Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: SIPRI Yearbook, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008, pp. 373-375; Gunnar Arbman, Charles Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons. 
Part I: Background and Policy Issues, p. 17; Anatoli Diakov, Eugene Myasnikov, Timur Kadyshev, Non-
strategic nuclear weapons: Problems of control and reduction., pp. 15, 17. 
 
While discussing the divergence of existing assessments, it is important to note that they all are in-
direct and often differ from each other either in the presumed baseline, or method, or both. 
One method, applied in particular by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (SDRA) and the Mon-
terey (California)-based Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), departs from a baseline as-
sessment of the Soviet TNW stockpile and its breakdown into different categories (general purpose 
ground forces, air force, navy and ballistic and air defences) as published by Alexei Arbatov in 
1999.19
Analysts deduct from those figures the cuts anticipated by the Russian PNIs and reported by Rus-
sian officials (see Table 2). In 2004, Moscow officials reported that Russia had “practically imple-
mented” the PNIs and, in 2005, 2006 and 2007, that their implementation even exceeded the PNIs’ 
goals after 75 per cent of the total TNW stock had been destroyed.
 According to the latter, in 1991 Russia disposed of a total of 21,700 TNW both deployed 
and in different types of reserve. 
20
 
 
 
                                                     
19  Gunnar Arbman, Charles Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Part I: Background and Policy Issues, p. 
16–17; Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) 
Nuclear Weapons in Europe, p. 8. 
20  Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear 
Weapons in Europe, p. 7. 
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Table 2: Reduction of Russian TNW as anticipated by the PNIs 
 
 
Categories 
 
 
Stockpile 1991 
 
Anticipated reductions 
 
Remaining 
Ground forces     
         Missiles 4,000 4,000 0 
        Artillery 2,000 2,000 0 
        Engineers 700 700 0 
Missile/Air defence 3,000 1,500 1,500 
Air force 7,000 3,500 3,500 
Navy    
        Ships, submarines 3,000 1,000 2,000 
        Naval aviation 2,000 1,000 1,000 
    
Total 
 
21,700 13 700 8,000 
Source: Alexander Pikaev, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, p. 120 (corrected as far as the number of war-
heads for naval aviation is concerned). 
 
This method gives some proper sense of the magnitude of actual TNW holdings in Russia, while 
the difference in the numbers given by the SDRA (8,000) and the CNS (5,000 to 6,700) is easily 
explained. By the time the SDRA assessment was made, Russian PNIs were not yet fully imple-
mented, not to speak of their reported over-implementation, which is accounted for in the CNS as-
sessment. 
The accuracy of these calculations, however, is not unchallenged. Since the Russian government 
never released any baseline figures or their breakdown but only indicated the ratio of anticipated 
and performed reductions in percentage, most analysts tend to rely on the accuracy of Arbatov’s 
data. This should, however, not be taken for granted. Indeed, assessments of appropriate baseline 
figures vary significantly.21 Another baseline figure of between 15,000 and 17,000 weapons instead 
of 21,700 is taken for the correct one by a number of analysts.22
But even those experts who take Arbatov’s data as the baseline admit that it is not perfect. Pomper, 
Potter and Sokov note, for instance, that “when percentages of reduction in each category supplied” 
by the Russian military “are put against the breakdown by category in 1991 according to figures 
provided by Arbatov, serious discrepancies emerged”. “This discrepancy could stem from possible 
inaccuracies in Arbatov’s account of the breakdown by category, or the rounding of numbers” by 
Russian officials, “or any other reason”.
 
23
Other analysts (NRDC) seek to remedy this inaccuracy by adding an assessment of the maximum 
load of nuclear-capable tactical delivery systems, or a third criterion – the reduced Russian capacity 
to refurbish old warheads and supply new ones. The latter method is based on the fact that all Rus-
sian nuclear warheads have relatively short warranty times of a maximum of fifteen years. This im-
plies that all of them must have been replaced in the last twenty years. Thus industrial capacity, 
which has reduced by a factor of approximately ten due to the implementation of conversion pro-
grams, sets a limit to the maintenance of the size of both the Russian strategic and TNW arsenals.
 This explains the relatively large span in the CNS as-
sessment of the total numbers of Russian TNW from 5,000 to 6,700. 
24
                                                     
21  For the diversity of those assessments see: Gunnar Arbman, Charles Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons. 
Part I: Background and Policy Issues, pp. 14-15. 
 
22  General (ret.) Vladimir Belous, for instance, estimates the Soviet stock of tactical nuclear weapons at the end of 
1980s at 15,000-17,000. See: Vladimir Belous, Tactical nuclear arms at the brink of the 21st century. 
23  Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear 
Weapons in Europe, p. 43. 
24  For more on this see: Anatoli Diakov, Eugene Myasnikov, Timur Kadyshev, Non-strategic nuclear weapons: Prob-
lems of control and reduction, pp. 16-18. 
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Neither of those remedies, however, distinctly improves the accuracy of existing assessments of the 
total Russian TNW stock. 
 
 
Breakdown by category 
 
For a better understanding of the background of the issue, the total numbers of Russian TNW need 
to be broken down in different ways. 
Firstly, a breakdown on the basis of the assignment of different weapons to different types of gen-
eral purpose forces (ground, air, navy) as well as missile/air defence is not only important for speci-
fying the variety of operational weapons but also for better understanding the particular interests of 
individual groups within the defence establishment, as manifested in the evolving Russian TNW 
discourse. 
Secondly and particularly against the background of the generic definition of TNW as weapons not 
covered by existing nuclear arms control instruments, it is important to distinguish between their 
types based on range and possible missions. In this regard, three classes of such weapons are identi-
fied in this study: those for longer-range (operatively strategic) or intermediate delivery systems; 
those for short-range (operatively tactical or tactical) delivery systems; and antiballistic and air de-
fence munitions, which represent a special class of TNW of their own. This distinction is important 
for the discussion of the evolution of the Russian nuclear posture in the second section of this 
study. 
As revealed in Table 3 below, existing assessments of the numbers of TNW assigned to different 
types of forces vary no less than those of the total stockpile. But they reveal similar features. 
Although the elimination of all TNW for ground forces is questioned by some analysts,25 and de-
spite the reports that the new land-based short-range missile “Iskander” being developed to replace 
the dual-capable “Tochka” missile may also be certified for nuclear missions,26 the general depar-
ture point is that, as anticipated by the PNIs, all Russian land-based TNW have been removed from 
active service and destroyed.27
Most Russian TNW are assigned to the air force and the navy. Although a large proportion of air 
force, navy and air defence TNW are reportedly no longer in active service and have been moved 
to central storage facilities deep inside Russian territory, a number of air force and navy nuclear 
weapons are still assumed to remain operative and to be kept in depots at air force and navy bases, 
i.e. close to the relevant delivery systems.
 
28
In contrast to the US, Russia has maintained not only short-range (under 500 km) tactical (battle-
field or frontal) dual-capable (conventional and nuclear) platforms, but also nuclear weapons for 
them, such as short-range air-to-surface frontal and naval aviation missiles, and anti-ship and anti-
submarine depth bombs and torpedoes. The distinctive mission of such weapons, in contrast to the 
ones of longer range, is not to damage military, economic, or administrative targets, but to deter or 
repel large-scale attack operations on the battlefield.
 Thus, despite the significantly reduced alert readiness 
of the relevant nuclear weapon systems resulting from the implementation of the PNIs, an unspeci-
fied quantity of TNW is still available for relatively quick deployment. 
29
 
 
                                                     
25  See, e.g., Robert S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen, Russian nuclear forces, 2010, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
January/February 2010, p. 79. 
26  Anatoli Diakov, Eugene Myasnikov, Timur Kadyshev, Non-strategic nuclear weapons: Problems of control and 
reduction, p. 20. See also: International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, 
“Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers”, p. 21. 
27  Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear 
Weapons in Europe, p. 7. 
28  International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A 
Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers”, p. 21. 
29  Ibid., p. 18. 
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Table 3: Russian TNW by category 
 
  Active Including in reserve 
  
Delivery systems 
 
NRDC 
2010 
 
SIPRI 2008 
 
NRDC 
2010 
 
CNS 
2009 
 
SDRA 
2003 
 
Ground 
Forces 
 
 
Missiles, artillery, mines 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
Air Forces Total 
 
TU-22M (longer range) 
SU-24 (frontal) 
 
650 524 
 
124 
400 
2,000 3,500 3,500 
Navy Total 
 
700 819 2,270 1,660 3,000 
including: naval aviation 
 
TU-22M (longer range) 
SU-24 
Il-38 
 
 295 
 
116 
116 
63 
  1,000 
 SLCMs (longer range) 
 
 276    
 Antisubmarine (depth 
bombs, torpedoes), air de-
fence 
 
 248   2,000* 
Air/Missile 
Defence 
 
 630-700 733 1,120 1,200 1,500 
 * total TNW deployable on ships and submarines 
Sources: Robert S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen, Russian nuclear forces, 2010, p. 76, 79; Miles A. Pomper, William 
Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe, p. 
44; World Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: SIPRI Yearbook, 2008, pp. 373-375; Gunnar 
Arbman, Charles Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Part I: Background and Policy Issues, p. 17. 
 
At the same time, like the US, Russia has maintained longer-range (or intermediate) nuclear capa-
bilities. Those are represented by sea-launched cruise missiles of up to 3,000 km range for nuclear 
attack submarines as well as by longer-range Tu-22M aircraft capable of carrying nuclear ASMs 
and gravity bombs. These platforms, although not of inter-continental range, are often considered 
capable of performing operatively strategic missions.30
According to the SIPRI data (see Table 3), intermediate platforms comprise roughly one third of 
the TNW stockpiles of the Russian air force and about half of those of the navy. 
 Indeed, they are a left-over from the INF 
Treaty, which prohibited all similar – but only land-based – weapons systems: intermediate- and 
shorter-range (from 500 km) ballistic missiles as well as ground-launched cruise missiles. 
Nuclear munitions for ballistic and air defence (including naval air defence) represent a distinct 
class of weapons that are unable to hit the territory of other states. 
 
 
Storage sites location 
 
For the purposes of this study, it is important to differentiate not only the locations but, also, the 
different categories of storage facilities in which TNW are or can be kept. Those include: 
 
                                                     
30  Ibid., p. 17. 
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– operational depots from which those weapons can be relatively quickly deployed; 
– central storage facilities where they are kept in reserve, and 
– storage facilities at factories in which nuclear warheads await disassembly or transportation to 
central storage or operational depots. 
 
General or detailed information concerning nuclear storage facilities including their locations is 
considered to be one of the most sensitive issues by all nuclear states, and Russia is no exception. 
While, under strategic nuclear arms control treaties, Moscow provides information on the locations 
of deployed strategic nuclear weapons, locations of other nuclear weapons are not disclosed. 
For this reason, any assessment of where TNW are stored after they have been removed from ac-
tive service is almost impossible, while any publicly available relevant information is neither reli-
able, nor complete or conclusive. 
The issue is further complicated by the fact that TNW in central storage facilities – i.e. not stored at 
separate air or naval depots – are believed to be kept together with strategic nuclear weapons, so 
that there appear to be no distinct central storage facilities for them.31
The publicly available information, however unreliable or inconclusive it is, nonetheless allows us 
to distinguish four types of Russian nuclear weapon storage facilities: 
 
 
– air and naval bases at which only TNW (active non-deployed) are stored; 
– storage sites specifically assigned to strategic weapons; 
– national level (central) storage sites at which both strategic warheads and TNW are or may be 
stored; and 
– storage facilities at warhead production plants, also for both strategic weapons and TNW. 
 
Except for the facilities explicitly assigned to strategic weapons, the other three categories of de-
pots either do or are likely to harbour TNW. 
The overall number of Russian nuclear storage facilities is reported to have been reduced from 
some 500, early in the 1990s, to a total of 48 sites at which nuclear weapons are permanently 
stored. Many of them may comprise several individual depots.32
Table 4 below presents a selection of storage facilities from the list compiled by Norris and Kris-
tensen which are believed to possibly serve the purpose of permanently storing TNW. Facilities for 
the storage of strategic warheads are exempted from this list, while the remaining facilities are split 
into two main groups: a) those apparently assigned to the storage of TNW and b) national-level 
sites and/or production facilities assigned to the storage of warheads in reserve or retired. In each 
category, locations in the European part of Russia and beyond the Urals are listed separately. 
 
The first group includes 13 sites. Nine of them are located in the European part of the Russia: three 
air bases (in the regions of Novgorod and Arkhangelsk in the Northwest of Russia as well as near 
Kaluga in the Central district), one central storage site for warheads for naval forces on the north-
western Kola Peninsula, as well as five sites with nuclear munitions for ballistic defence systems 
near Moscow. Four sites – three air bases and one naval depot – are reportedly located beyond the 
Urals, either in Siberia (Irkutsk), or in the Far East (Khabarovsk and Primorsky regions). 
The second group includes 18 national-level weapons storage sites and/or production facilities. Ten 
of them are located in the European part of Russia, four in the Urals (including two nuclear war-
head production plants and one weapons design laboratory). A further four sites are located in Sibe-
ria and the Far East. 
                                                     
31  Alexei Arbatov, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, p. 36. 
32  Robert S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen, Nuclear notebook: Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2009, in: 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2009, pp. 86-88. 
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Table 4: Possible TNW storage sites 
 
Location Region TNW Weapons systems 
 
a) For TNW 
In the European part of Russia 
 
Lakhta-Kholm Air Base Arkhangelsk AS-4 ASM, bombs For TU-22M3 
Vidyaevo naval base Kola Various warheads for naval forces in central storage 
Soltsy Air Base Novgorod AS-4 ASM, bombs For TU-22M3 
Shaykovka Air Base Kaluga AS-4 ASM, bombs for TU-22M3 
Korolev area Moscow Gazelle ABMs ABM interceptors 
Lytkarino area Moscow Gazelle ABMs ABM interceptors 
Skhodnyha area Moscow Gazelle ABMs ABM interceptors 
Sofrino area Moscow Gazelle ABMs ABM interceptors 
Vnukovo area Moscow Gazelle ABMs ABM interceptors 
 
Beyond the Urals 
 
Belaya Air Base Irkutsk AS-4 ASM, bombs for TU-22M3 
Mongokhto (Alek-
seevka) Air Base 
Khabarovsk AS-4 ASM, bombs for TU-22M3 
Vozdvizhenka Air Base Primorsky AS-4 ASM, bombs for TU-22M3 
Chazma Primorsky SLCMs, ASWs naval weapons 
 
b) Diverse weapons 
In the European part of Europe 
 
Chebsara Vologda Various national-level weapons storage site 
Nerpichya Kola Various potential storage facility for naval weapons 
Olenegorsk Kola Various possibly two national-level storage sites 
Sebezh-5 Pskov Various national-level weapons storage site 
Mozhaysk Moscow Various national-level weapons storage site 
Rzhanitsa Bryansk Various national-level weapons storage site 
Borisoglebsk Voronezh Various national-level weapons storage site 
Golovchino Belgorod Various national-level weapons storage site 
Krasnoarmeyskoe Saratov Various national-level weapons storage site 
Sarov Nizhny Novgorod Various former warhead production (ended in 2003), possi-
ble limited warhead storage 
 
Urals and beyond 
 
Lesnoy Sverdlovsk Various warhead production plant, national-level weapons 
storage site 
Karabask Chelyabinsk Various national-level weapons storage site 
Snezhinsk Chelyabinsk Various nuclear warhead design laboratory and national-level 
storage site 
Trekhgorny Chelyabinsk Various warhead production plant 
Dodonovo Krasnoyarsk Various national-level weapons storage site 
Korfovskiy Khabarovsk Various national-level weapons storage site 
Selikhino Khabarovsk Various national-level weapons storage site 
Zalari Transbaykal Various national-level weapons storage site 
 
Source:  Robert S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen, Nuclear notebook: Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2009, in: Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2009, pp. 92-94. 
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Map 1: Indicative map of alleged locations of nuclear weapons storage facilities in Russia 
 
 
 
Visualization according to Table 4 by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, 2009. 
 
Lacking further details, however, this review of possible geographic locations of TNW storage sites 
is of limited utility for the discussion of the Russian TNW posture in the following section of this 
study. 
 
Consequences for arms control 
 
1. It is the operative (active non-deployed) weapons and their storage facilities at the air and naval 
bases rather than weapons in central storage or those stored at assembly and disassembly plants that 
shall be the primary focus of any initial arms control measures. It is precisely those weapons that 
can be operatively deployed on relatively short notice without the knowledge of the other side. 
They are therefore the centre of concern and the potential cause of crisis instability, as they are 
considered more vulnerable to theft and/or unauthorized use than weapons kept in central storage. 
 
2. Notwithstanding the inconclusive picture of the real locations of TNW depots, an overview of 
the publicly available information in Table 4 suggests that measures based on geography, i.e. mov-
ing the storage locations of Russian TNW away from the proximity to the Russia-NATO or Russia-
EU borders, or moving them “deep into the national territory” are unlikely to provide a solution to 
concerns expressed by a number of countries. 
Not only the operative depots at naval bases but also the known naval weapons central storage fa-
cilities are located relatively close to the potential areas of their deployment both in the North-West 
of the European part of Russia (particularly on the Kola Peninsula) and in the Far East (Primorsky 
region). As a result, the relocation of warheads from the former to the latter would not significantly 
change the geography of their storage unless the central facilities themselves are moved (new ones 
constructed) further away. 
Apart from this, the very fact that TNW and their delivery systems are mobile makes the verifica-
tion of geographic restrictions on their storage and deployment difficult and largely ineffective. 
This is particularly true with regard to intermediate-range weapons. For this reason, concentrating 
all TNW in central storage facilities regardless of their geographic location can be seen as an alter-
native method of addressing the issue, as opposed to the introduction of geographically defined 
“exclusion zones”, in which the storage of those weapons would be prohibited or restricted.33
                                                     
33  Steven Pifer, The Next Round: the United States and Nuclear Arms Reductions After New START. Brookings 
Arms Control Series, Paper 4, December 2010, p. 19. 
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Part II. Alleged Utility of TNW 
 
 
During the Cold War, TNW were largely seen by the Soviet military establishment as a means of 
deterring NATO from using its nuclear assets deployed in Europe and, at the same time, as a means 
of increasing the firepower of the Soviet general purpose forces. 
With the end of the Cold War, the Russian posture underwent a significant transformation which 
led it, firstly, to abandon the Soviet doctrine of no-first-use of nuclear weapons adopted in 1982, 
and, secondly, to identify new missions in the new security environment for TNW in particular. 
 
 
A new role for TNW 
 
The notion of the increasing role of TNW was already conventional wisdom among Russian and 
international experts in the early 1990s. Mirroring the US and NATO posture of the Cold War pe-
riod, TNW are supposed to compensate for the continuous decline of the conventional forces of 
Russia, for the numerical and qualitative conventional superiority of NATO, as well as for the nu-
merical inferiority of the Russian forces in the Far East vis-à-vis China.34
Based on the lessons learned by the Russian military establishment from the wars waged by mili-
tarily advanced nations over the past two decades, i.e. the war in the Gulf in 1991, the 1999 NATO 
air campaign in Kosovo-Yugoslavia, the campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002, and the war in 
Iraq in 2003, the two most recent Russian military doctrines (2000 and 2010) concluded that the 
likelihood of a large scale war
 In the 1990s, however, 
this thesis remained mainly a matter of theory. Only later in that decade was it elaborated in greater 
detail and received public articulation. 
35 against the Russian Federation had diminished,36
At the same time, both doctrines accept the thesis that other types of warfare – armed conflict, local 
or regional wars
 particularly the 
likelihood of a large scale nuclear war, which was becoming increasingly improbable. 
37 – remain a means of resolving inter- or intra-state disputes. Spillover effects be-
tween those types of military confrontation are not excluded. Defence analysts tend to be con-
vinced that, in the time to come, inter-state conflict, military confrontation and war between states 
become increasingly likely and may well entail the use of nuclear weapons, which are perceived as 
an essential aspect of contemporary statecraft.38
The military doctrine does not exclude the possibility that Russia may become involved into a local 
or regional war as a result of being attacked, through its mutual assistance obligations or as the 
consequence of a spillover of a local or regional military confrontation. In that context, particularly 
due to Russia’s conventional weakness, defence analysts assign nuclear weapons a major role in 
deterring the enemy, in terminating the war by using or threatening to use nuclear weapons in a 
limited and selective manner, and in defeating the enemy. This concerns TNW first and foremost, 
though not exclusively. 
 
                                                     
34  For a review of the 1990s debate see, e.g., Gunnar Arbman, Charles Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons. 
Part I: Background and Policy Issues, pp. 24-27. 
35  A war between coalitions of states or between major military powers pursuing radical goals. The Military Doctrine 
of the Russian Federation, approved on 5 February 2010 (in Russian), Part I.6. (General provisions, main definiti-
ons), paragraph З. Available at: http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461, 8/2/2010. 
36  The 2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Part II.7. (Military Risks and Threats to the Russian Federa-
tion). 
37  Armed conflict – armed confrontation between states or between belligerent parties within a state; local war – a war 
between two or more states pursuing limited goals and waged within the borders of the states concerned; regional 
war – a war between two or more states pursuing important military-political goals and waged by national and coa-
lition armed forces, which may use both conventional and nuclear arms. The 2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation, Part I.6. (General provisions, main definitions), paragraphs д, е, ж. 
38  Alexander Radchuk, The Great Nuclear Game of the 21st Century: Disarmament or War?, in: Security Index, Mos-
cow, Issue 4, 2010, pp. 33-34, 37-38. 
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In order to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence effect under the conditions of a regional war, 
Russia believes it should not rely on strategic nuclear forces, or on them only, but must maintain a 
range of options for the limited or selective use of nuclear weapons in order to be able to inflict a 
precisely set level of damage to the enemy sufficient to convince him to terminate military confron-
tation by exposing him to the danger of further nuclear escalation. This is where TNW come into 
play, although, depending on which war scenarios one considers, the employment of one or more 
strategic weapons is not excluded either.39
The ability to inflict a set level of damage to the attacker is the central element to the doctrine of 
nuclear de-escalation of an armed conflict, even if such a conflict begins as a conventional one.
 
40
Firstly and most importantly, it was the increasing weakness (many defence analysts speak of a vir-
tual degradation) of the conventional general purpose forces of the Russian Federation which are 
considered unlikely to be able, in the time to come, to be fit to repel any large-scale or even limited 
regional conventional attack. This diagnosis has become commonplace in open publications by rep-
resentatives of the Russian defence establishment. This has led defence analysts to believe that nu-
clear weapons remain the single most important means of preserving Russia’s and its allies’ mili-
tary security by deterring and preventing not only a nuclear but also conventional attacks.
 
The nuclear de-escalation doctrine was developed in a strategic and regional security environment 
characterized by three major developments affecting Russian defence policy thinking and planning. 
41
Secondly, lessons learned by the Russian defence community from the wars of the last twenty years 
implied that any future war involving advanced military powers was most likely to entail stand-off 
warfighting via the deployment of long-distance precision-guided munitions, such as conventional 
ballistic and cruise missiles in conjunction with space-based intelligence and information sys-
tems.
 Al-
though most defence analysts admit that this is a temporary solution until the Russian general pur-
pose forces have overcome the state of decline of the last twenty years, the questions of how long it 
will take Russian armed forces to recover and whether they will be able to match the most ad-
vanced military powers remain open. 
42
It is believed that this will further complicate the task of Russian general purpose forces to respond 
appropriately to a stand-off conventional attack, thus almost automatically elevating nuclear arms 
to the weapons of choice for an (asymmetric) response to such an attack. It is believed that it would 
be possible to anticipate a reduction of the role currently assigned to nuclear weapons only after 
the Russian forces have advanced in utilizing new military technologies,
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 or after military ad-
vanced nations have agreed to abandon or at least significantly limit them by means of arms con-
trol, thus abandoning military options those technologies have opened or may open in the future. 
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50% in the 2001-2002 campaign in Afghanistan and 60% in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir 
Dvorkin, Sergei Oznobishchev,  Non-Nuclear Factors of Nuclear Disarmament, Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2010, p. 
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Thirdly, anticipating the possibility of either a massive or a limited conventional air and missile at-
tack (or, to put it in the language of the Russian military doctrine, anticipating an attack “from air 
and outer space”44
 
) increases the priority given to the need to dramatically upgrade Russian air and 
outer space defence capabilities as envisaged by both the military doctrine and the long-term de-
fence capabilities planning of the Russian Federation. This debate again raises the question of what 
systems, including whether conventional, nuclear or both, could better serve this purpose. 
The nuclear de-escalation doctrine 
 
The opening of a public debate over the nuclear de-escalation doctrine is usually dated with the 
publication, early in 1999, of an article by Major-General Levshin, Colonel Dr. Nedelin, and Colo-
nel and Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences Sosnovskii in the major Russian military 
Journal “Voennaya Mysl” (“Military Thought”).45 The concept must have been developed much 
earlier, however. For instance, in his introduction to a study on the future of Russian nuclear forces 
published in April 1999, Colonel-General Evgenii Maslin, former head of the 12th GUMO in 
charge of the Russian nuclear posture, referred to this concept as if it was already a well known to 
nuclear strategists.46 It is therefore logical to assume that the concept matured within the Russian 
defence establishment at least from the mid-1990s, while the 1999 Kosovo war, in particular, of-
fered a welcome opportunity to introduce it to the political leadership, which sought informed ad-
vice on what its strategy could be provided Russia was exposed to the threat of a similar attack.47
Neither the first (2000), nor the second (2010) military doctrine of the Russian Federation explic-
itly spell out the concept of de-escalation, restricting themselves to the most general political prin-
ciples governing decisions on the potential use of nuclear weapons, while operational issues trans-
lating those general principles into particular defence planning, training, policies and procedures 
are reserved for internal guidelines. Both doctrines, however, explicitly green-light a nuclear re-
sponse to a conventional attack that exceeds Russia’s conventional defence capability, and resort to 
concepts, particularly to that of the “set level of damage” to be inflicted to the enemy,
 
48
Levshin, Nedelin and Sosnovskii suggested that, provided nuclear deterrence has not worked and 
Russia has been attacked by conventional means, nuclear weapons should be regarded not only as a 
means of defeating the enemy but, first of all, as a means of forcing the opponent to de-escalate 
military confrontation. For this, the de-escalation posture anticipates the use of nuclear weapons 
either for demonstrative purposes (to show the determination to take the conflict to the nuclear 
level), or to directly attack the opposing forces. They suggested that this mission should be as-
 which are 
closely associated with the de-escalation doctrine. 
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signed explicitly and exclusively to TNW in order to avoid the risk of uncontrolled escalation to a 
large-scale nuclear exchange.49
A limited, selective and tailored use of TNW is supposed to show the attacker Russia’s determina-
tion to deny him a victory. Should the attacker be one of the major nuclear powers, it would have a 
choice of either terminating the hostilities and return to the status quo ante bellum, or to accept the 
risk of further escalation to the level of strategic nuclear weapons which, at the same time, would 
be deterred by the second-strike nuclear capability of Russia. Should the attacker be a non-nuclear 
state, a demonstrative nuclear strike, or a strike at its forces, military, administrative or economic 
targets is supposed to force him to terminate the military confrontation on the terms of the Russian 
Federation. 
 
Thinking in terms of nuclear de-escalation has meanwhile become a commonplace within the Rus-
sian defence establishment. For about a decade, standard formulas related to this doctrine have 
been migrating from one article by defence analysts to another,50
Firstly, it is asserted that official Russian military doctrine – beginning in 1993 – has re-legalized 
the first use of nuclear weapons, which was banned by the Soviet Union in 1982. It also has legal-
ized, with a few reservations, their first use in case of a non-nuclear attack on Russia. 
 as if copied from unpublicized 
documents that make the official military doctrine operational. These formulas include two explicit 
points and presume a third. 
Secondly, the doctrine presupposes that the Russian Federation should be able to precisely tailor the 
damage to be inflicted to the attacker by the use of nuclear weapons, as well as, if necessary, to in-
crease the inflicted damage step by step in order to persuade the attacker to terminate military con-
frontation. 
In order to be able to inflict the individually tailored level of damage in a landscape characterized 
by a great variety of potential war scenarios, the Russian Federation is required to have a wide 
choice of military options based on a large variety of available nuclear weapons of different ranges 
and yields. 
Thirdly, when accused of adventurism or gambling capable of triggering a nuclear holocaust, the 
proponents of nuclear de-escalation assert that a very selective use of nuclear arms in a conflict 
does not exclude, but does not inevitably lead to further nuclear escalation or the mutual annihila-
tion of the opponents.51
As a result, the concept of nuclear de-escalation explicitly admits the possibility of a limited nu-
clear war – military confrontation that entails limited use of nuclear weapons while avoiding fur-
ther escalation to a global nuclear war.
 
52
 
 Thus the evolution of the nuclear posture of the Russian 
Federation over the past twenty years came to a paradoxical presumption that it was precisely the 
decreasing probability of a global (large scale) nuclear war that made a limited regional or local 
nuclear war at least thinkable if not possible. 
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Theatres and missions 
 
The existing literature is not conclusive as regards the eventual theatres, missions and types of nu-
clear weapons which might be assigned for the purposes of nuclear de-escalation. Furthermore, the 
predominant view of the unpredictability of the unfolding security landscape along the perimeter of 
Russian borders rather suggests that the military planners are supposed to be prepared for any sort 
of contingencies and, for that reason, to prioritise the maintenance of a great variety of means to 
meet those contingencies, including TNW. This is particularly true against the background of the 
1993 assessment by the Military Academy of the Strategic Rocket Forces of Russia that regional 
wars were most likely to emerge as a result of the escalation of domestic armed conflicts or local 
wars. 
When introducing the concept of “nuclear de-escalation” in the late 1990s, the Russian defence es-
tablishment was obsessed with the possibility of a Kosovo-type US/NATO intervention in the war 
(“armed conflict”) in Chechnya, which resumed in 1999. It did not exclude the possibility that, in 
the event of such a case, Russia would be forced to resort to nuclear weapons.53
Usually, analysts explore the likelihood of the application of the nuclear de-escalation doctrine in 
four possible theatres: 
 
 
– Europe (an attack by the US and/or NATO) 
– Northeast Asia (an attack by the US and/or Japan) 
– Far East (an attack by China) 
– The South (military interventions by Turkey or Iran) 
 
The current preoccupation of the Russian military establishment with the threat of an air and mis-
sile (outer space) attack clearly points to the main addressee of the nuclear de-escalation doctrine, 
since the single power capable of triggering such an attack is the US. In 1999, Alexei Arbatov ex-
plicitly placed the possibility of the replication of the Kosovo campaign against Russia in conjunc-
tion with the de-escalation debate in Russia: 
 
“Russia’s principle strategic mission is to exclude the possibility that selective air and rocket 
strikes by NATO would go unpunished for some protracted period of time […] Russian selec-
tive strikes using tactical nuclear weapons would be justified […] In this case the other side 
would be challenged by an awful dilemma: either to stop the aggression and recognize the de-
feat, or to respond with a nuclear strike, which would be followed by an escalation to strategic 
nuclear exchange with catastrophic consequences for all countries. Lacking anything better, 
Russia sees this strategy as reasonable.”54
 
 
Most Russian analysts point out that the NATO’s eastward enlargement provided the military es-
tablishment with arguments in favour of a growing role for TNW to balance the numerical and par-
ticularly the increasing qualitative superiority of the Alliance.55
Apparently, Russian defence strategists find themselves confronted with a similar dilemma in 
Northeast Asia since “no other state in the region [than the US] has large-scale landing capabilities 
with massive air and space components. Russia has no means, other than nuclear weapons, to pre-
vent such landing operation”.
 
56
China is largely taboo in public Russian debates on military threat assessment, and in discussions 
of potential war theatres in which nuclear weapons could be deployed. There are, however, multi-
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ple indications that the use of nuclear weapons, including TNW, is part of more complex consid-
erations by Russian defence planners bearing in mind the numerical inferiority of the Russian 
troops deployed vis-à-vis the Chinese forces. One of the very rare open sources making the fears of 
the Russian defence planners explicit is a piece by the then head of the Center for Military-Political 
Studies of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Vladimir Ostankov, who wrote 
in 2005: 
 
“Despite a current stable relationship between the Russian Federation and the PRC, old suspi-
cions about large scale armed non-nuclear conflict between the two countries have not disap-
peared […] Prevention of such conflict by political methods only […] or by conventional 
forces may be inefficient. Because of the Chinese factor, Russia’s policy is to be founded on 
nuclear weapons […].”57
 
 
Although the applicability of the Russian nuclear doctrine in the southern tier is questioned by most 
experts,58 some Russian analysts speculate about the possibility of relying on TNW in order to “de-
ter regional powers such as Iran or Turkey from expanding into the former Soviet Union”.59
However, if the assumed theatres for the deployment of Russian TNW are compared with the as-
sumed location of the depots where those weapons are stored, as discussed in the previous section, 
it appears evident that the weapons operatively available at air and naval bases are located in a way 
that makes their deployment in the European and Far Eastern theatres more plausible. Many of 
those weapons are nonetheless designed for forward deployment in virtually any theatre. 
 One 
hypothetical scenario considered by Russian experts implies, for instance, an intervention by Tur-
key in a potential war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which would put at risk a small contingent 
of Russian forces in Armenia – the single most important Russian military outpost in the South 
Caucasus. The only means by which Russia could protect that contingent would be to deter any 
Turkish military intervention by the threat of the use of TNW. 
 
Based on the great variety of potential contingencies and war scenarios, the missions to be per-
formed by nuclear arms under the de-escalation doctrine also vary significantly. They directly de-
pend on the definition of the level of damage to be in inflicted in any particular situation. 
On the one hand, this implies the possibility of deploying “demonstrative” nuclear strikes in order 
to convince the attacker of the determination of Russia to deny him a victory by escalating the war 
to the nuclear level. An example that is often quoted to highlight this option refers to the scenario 
of the “Zapad 99” military exercises conducted by Russian and Belarusian armed forces in June 
1999. The alleged scenario of the exercises was that NATO launched massive non-nuclear air and 
missile strikes against Belarus and the Kaliningrad region. After the joint Russian-Belarusian 
forces had failed to stop further escalation or to repel the attack, Russia decided to launch a demon-
strative limited nuclear strike against targets in remote northern areas of North America.60
Another option considered under the de-escalation missions entails a limited strike against the en-
emy’s grouping of forces or select economic facilities by a relatively low-yield tactical nuclear 
weapon.
 
61
A nuclear strike against an attacking air force or approaching missiles by nuclear air defence weap-
ons is considered an almost perfect means of de-escalation, as it would not inflict bigger damage on 
the opponent and thus would not necessarily provoke further escalation of nuclear exchanges.
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The same approach is suggested considering the potential arming with nuclear weapons of outer 
space defence systems under development.63
Nuclear forces, including TNW, are supposed to perform missions against military instruments of 
the enemy. In particular, their role is to hit those military instruments which are located beyond the 
actual theatre of military confrontation and can be used in a stand-off attack on Russia. This is the 
conclusion of the “White book” published by the Russian Ministry of Defence in 2003.
 
64
This implies missions against remote locations or patrolling areas of the belligerent long-range air 
force or maritime forces and bases, particularly by means of longer-range air force or sea-launched 
cruise missiles. It is believed, for instance that, in 2003, while conducting naval exercises in the In-
dian Ocean, Russian forces were practising launches of SLCMs against targets located in the 
Ocean, thus simulating strikes against US warships as well as the Diego Garcia naval base.
 
65
 
 
The publicly available information and assessments, however, appear either too fragmented or are 
frequently speculative and thus hardly a sufficient basis for drawing firm conclusions about antici-
pated theatres and missions to be performed by TNW within the context of the de-escalation doc-
trine. In order to compensate for this inconclusiveness, several researchers have attempted to scru-
tinize Russian military exercises conducted from 1999. They believe that at least in some of those 
exercises practical application of the de-escalation doctrine was practised. 
Despite the limited and often contradictory information available on Russian military manoeu-
vres,66 the most comprehensive analysis of the exercises conducted between 1999 and 2004 en-
abled Nikolai Sokov to make several generalizations67
 
: 
– In all or most exercises, Russian manoeuvres simulated regional war scenarios, all or almost 
all of which involved nuclear states, first and foremost the US. Earlier exercises simulated air 
and missile attacks on Russia, while the more recent ones sought to simulate the war in Iraq, 
or a massive conventional attack. 
– In both basic scenarios of either a stand-off air attack, or a combined air and ground assault on 
Russia, the simulation of the use of nuclear weapons was delayed for a few days until the Rus-
sian air defence and/or ground forces failed to repel the attack. 
– Whenever the use of nuclear weapons was simulated, it was most delivered via long- or me-
dium-range aircraft: TU-95MC, TU-160 (both strategic and covered by START) and TU-
22M3 (operatively strategic). 
– The most common targets for nuclear strikes included: air bases and other military facilities of 
the European NATO member states which participated in the simulated attack on Russia, as 
well as, in at least one case, similar facilities in Japan; non-identified targets on the territory of 
the US; naval targets – aircraft-carrying groupings of ships in the Pacific, Baltic Sea, Indian 
Ocean and the Black Sea; land-based military facilities in the Indian Ocean. 
 
This analysis brought Pomper, Potter and Sokov to the conclusion that a) it was not only TNW that 
could be assigned a de-escalation mission, but b) that the anticipated role of different classes of 
TNW needed to be further differentiated in the context of their utility for the purposes of de-
escalation. They argue, in particular, that shorter-range weapons systems, such as tactical land-
based missiles or tactical aircraft, have little or no role in the de-escalation doctrine as potential tar-
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gets are too distant.68
For this reason, they claim that shorter-range weapons systems have low military utility while the 
de-escalating mission is primarily assigned to intermediate-range, or operatively strategic delivery 
systems (medium and heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs, ASMs and SLCMs). This would po-
tentially allow Russia to considerably reduce the stockpiles of shorter-range TNW, if not to elimi-
nate the whole class.
 This finding is extended to both the European (US and NATO) and the Far 
Eastern (China) theatres, based on the assumption that deploying TNW against the manpower of 
Chinese armed forces makes little sense as long as more important targets in the rear could be en-
visaged. 
69
It remains uncertain, however, whether the evidence collected from the observation of a series of 
military exercises based on publicly available sources suffices to support these conclusions. None-
theless, it is obvious that they contradict the declared posture explicitly anticipating the use of short 
range (operatively tactical) delivery systems not only for the purposes of terminating an armed con-
flict but also to defeat an opponent.
 
70
 
 This is particularly true with regard to the Russian Navy 
which, for all sorts of reasons, got used to heavily relying on shorter range nuclear anti-ship, sub-
marine and air defence weapons. 
 
Consequences for arms control 
 
1. The theory of the increasing utility of TNW, which are supposed to compensate for conventional 
weakness is not uncontested within the Russian security community. Nor is it universally accepted 
within the defence establishment. The opponents of the de-escalation doctrine suggest that defence 
planning, procurement and research and development should give priority to introducing modern 
command, control and communication systems as well as advanced conventional capabilities in-
cluding PGMs, rather than to maintaining a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, and particularly 
TNW.71
For the time being, this debate remains of predominantly theoretical value, however. The propo-
nents of the nuclear de-escalation posture formally don’t disagree with the above conclusion and 
admit that the role of nuclear weapons, including TNW, in the Russian defence posture would de-
crease if Russia matched the advanced military powers or if the latter accepted restrictions on de-
veloping advanced capabilities by international agreements. But the bottom line of this debate sug-
gests that Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons will remain as long as the existing gap has not 
closed. 
 This debate has been repeatedly waged and is closely linked to the discussion of the ap-
propriate way of spending scarce resources. 
Despite the formal priority given to the introduction of advanced weapons technologies in long-
term research and development, procurement programs and defence planning, the anticipated time 
horizon for attaining this goal is rather long term. While, ten years ago, it was supposed that Russia 
would be able to close the gap within ten years72 (i.e. by now), it is now suggested that it will take 
no less than another fifteen years.73
In following this logic, Moscow moves in the opposite direction to the trend highlighted by the 
2010 US Nuclear Posture Review, which anticipates a further decrease of the role of nuclear weap-
 And it cannot be taken for granted that, fifteen years from now, 
this goal will be attained. 
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ons as a result of the continued advance of conventional capabilities. Being confronted with a 
growing gap in developing and introducing advanced weapons technologies, Moscow finds itself in 
a trap and anticipates that the relevance of nuclear weapons for its posture is likely to grow further, 
while it may decline for the US. 
These two distinct trajectories largely explain the differences in the two countries’ views of the 
goals of the Global Zero campaign and their approaches to the TNW reductions. 
 
2. As a result, the nuclear de-escalation doctrine became deeply rooted and now represents main-
stream thinking within the Russian defence establishment. It is no surprise that it is also explicitly 
welcomed by the Russian nuclear industry, which is engaged in the manufacturing, maintenance, 
refurbishing and disposal of nuclear weapons. Thus it is likely that strong opposition will be gener-
ated by the defence and defence-industrial establishment to any significant cuts of the Russian 
TNW stock. This opposition would not remain without an echo among policy makers, either. 
 
3. Suggestions that a compromise be sought between reducing the conventional superiority of 
NATO in traditional heavy weapons systems limited by the CFE and the reduction of the Russian 
stockpiles of TNW appear to miss the complexity of the issue. The declared rationale for maintain-
ing Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons has only partly to do with the disparities that have 
emerged in Europe in the area of traditional heavy weapons. The Russian defence establishment 
appears increasingly concerned with the advanced conventional capabilities of the NATO states, 
and the US in particular, that are not covered by the CFE regime. Thus any openness towards re-
ducing TNW is more likely to be tacitly or explicitly linked by the Russian defence establishment 
not only to progress in re-negotiating the CFE regime but, rather to progress in controlling ad-
vanced conventional warfare capabilities under relevant arms control accords. 
 
4. Further differentiation of TNW is helpful for the purpose of better understanding their different 
missions and, hence, for the design of appropriate arms control solutions. It does not justify, how-
ever, a simple conclusion that progress can be relatively easily obtained in limiting and/or reducing 
some types of TNW (i.e. weapons for short range systems) while it would take longer to capture 
other types (i.e. weapons for intermediate-range or operatively tactical arms). The Russian defence 
establishment clearly prefers not to reduce any nuclear option. 
 
5. It remains an open question whether the issue of TNW is better addressed in its entirety, regard-
less of where such weapons are geographically located in the Russian Federation. Including weap-
ons stored in the European while excluding those in the Asian part of the country would have po-
litical disadvantages for Moscow, as it would discriminate against China by potentially allowing 
Russia to move excess warheads beyond the Urals. The recognition of the negative consequences 
of such an approach for Russo-Chinese and the US-Japanese relations is one of the reasons for Ste-
ven Pifer to give the preference to global rather than regional limits on TNW.74
 
 
5. Nevertheless, the large stockpile of Russian TNW apparently exceeds the requirements of the 
nuclear de-escalation doctrine. This conclusion is supported not least by the fact that Moscow re-
duced it beyond its commitments under the PNIs, and the stockpile is expected to further shrink. 
This indicates that there is some room for converting ongoing unilateral reductions of US and Rus-
sian TNW into an agreement that would provide for greater transparency and, possibly, verification 
of this process. 
 
 
                                                     
74  Steven Pifer, The Next Round: the United States and Nuclear Arms Reductions After New START, p. 19. 
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Part III: Political Constraints 
 
 
The Russian agenda for arms control is wide and comprehensive. TNW, however, do not figure on 
it except for the demand that, as a first step, the US should withdraw its remaining TNW from 
Europe. 
This is not surprising. TNW is the single weapons category in which Russia maintains a numerical 
advantage over the US, not to speak of other nuclear powers. Powerful domestic constituencies, 
particularly the defence establishment, the nuclear industry and their representation in higher eche-
lons of the government, are opposed to proposals to cut this advantage while there are virtually no 
politically relevant interest groups championing TNW reductions. 
The past decade saw domestic developments that were not conducive to changing this picture. The 
increasingly rigid, non-transparent, uncompetitive and unaccountable political system that emerged 
in Russia over the last ten years does not leave much space for public debates in which policy op-
tions are openly examined. The growing compartmentalization of Russian politics, and particularly 
the security and defence sectors, resulted in the migration of key expertise and responsibility for 
informing and advising government decisions to those groups and agencies that have a vested in-
terest in maintaining the status quo. 
At the same time, the increasing incompetence in other “compartments” and at the higher levels of 
the government, as well as the lack of alternative opinions and opportunities to publicly articulate 
them from outside the government strengthened the monopoly of the defence establishment, leav-
ing its political advice almost unchallenged. 
The lack of proper rotation at the centre of political power in Moscow further strengthened the con-
servatism that tends to follow the path of previous decisions without questioning them or subjecting 
policies to regular review. It usually takes a strong shock to alter such entrenched positions. 
All this affects the TNW discussions in Russia, which remain one of the least transparent areas of 
Russian defence policy. It caused powerful inertia in the extremely conservative approaches to 
TNW as they matured within the defence establishment from the late 1990s and were translated 
into politics. 
As a result, the Russian government and the political class can hardly be expected to seek any 
changes to the existing status quo. One should not expect them to be open to various initiatives to 
that effect, nor to be prepared to abandon the prevailing scepticism or even hostility extended to 
any proposal that foresees “unilateral” reductions or limitations of Russian TNW. 
Any strong incentives to challenge this inertia are highly unlikely to emanate from within the Rus-
sian Federation. They may come from outside the country, however, if the Russian leadership is 
sincerely and continuously engaged on the issue by its crucial partners, first and foremost by the 
US, and/or if the security environment in which Russia finds itself or the perception of this envi-
ronment changes or starts changing dramatically, not least as a result of such engagement. 
 
 
Vested interest in maintaining the status quo 
 
Moscow resisted as premature the idea of including TNW in the 2009-2010 negotiation of the New 
START treaty. So did the US government. This resistance was largely due to the fear of complicat-
ing talks that were seen to be in the interest of the US and Russia and which became the single 
most important symbol of the re-set in Russo-American relations. 
However, in Moscow it is considered common sense to believe that subjecting Russian TNW to 
limitations or reductions is not in the Russian interest. The general reluctance of the Moscow po-
litical class to give up any advantage against the background of an overall military inferiority vis-à-
vis the West or China is cemented by firm opposition, particularly from the Russian defence estab-
32 
lishment, to reducing or limiting any of the military options it associates with TNW, as discussed 
above in the second section of this study. 
Pomper, Potter and Sokov made an attempt at differentiating among the individual actors within 
the Russian armed forces based on their policy on TNW.75
Further development and expansion of the nuclear capability of both the Russian missile and air de-
fence systems as well as outer space forces is actively campaigned for by the military establishment 
and military industries closely associated with this area of the Russian armed forces
 They proceed on the basis of the as-
sumption that the Russian Navy must be the main champion of TNW as it used to heavily rely on 
them (including anti-ship, anti-submarine and naval air defence weapons) when anticipating any 
encounter with the superior US Navy and thus considered itself the main victim of the PNIs. They 
also expect the Russian Air Force to be another champion of TNW for the simple reason that it 
maintains a significant nuclear capability. 
76
This assessment is partially true as far as the particular interests of the relevant sub-groups of the 
military establishment are concerned. It is also true, however, that despite continuous fighting over 
the distribution of budgetary appropriations between general purpose and nuclear forces, the mili-
tary establishment – the MoD and the General Staff – usually represent a rather conservative TNW 
policy and communicate a consolidated message, as the former head of the 12th GUMO, General 
Vladimir Verkhovskii, has repeatedly done in recent years:
. 
77
 
 
– the Russian Armed Forces shall retain TNW in their arsenals as long as other nations retain 
nuclear weapons, and 
– although those weapons are now stored in the central storage facilities of the 12th GUMO, 
Russian armed forces shall retain the option of redeploying them at any time, particularly to 
the Navy. 
 
Since the defence establishment appears to have regained its crucial role in determining Russia’s 
position in arms control negotiations by exercising a veto power on what it does not want to see in 
an agreement (unless it is overruled by the president, which is highly unlikely under current cir-
cumstances), these two positions of the Russian nuclear defence establishment can be largely per-
ceived as a bottom line for any TNW agreement. 
The scepticism of the Russian defence establishment extended to any TNW arms control arrange-
ments is shared by the nuclear arms industry, which resists the reduction of the total number of nu-
clear warheads employed by the Russian Armed Forces below an unspecified critical level, which 
would necessitate further reduction of the Russian industrial capacity to manufacture, refurbish, 
modernize and disassemble nuclear weapons, to dispose of fissile material and which would lead, 
over time, to budgetary cuts and reduced expertise.78
As important for understanding how the machinery of the Russian government works as identifying 
the national TNW champions is to realize that the pursuit of their policy remains virtually uncon-
tested domestically, since there are no relevant actors within the Russian government or society that 
are interested in (have a vested interest or otherwise anticipate any benefits to flow from an alterna-
tive policy) and capable of (have relevant political and/or administrative resources) challenging the 
 
                                                     
75  Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear 
Weapons in Europe, p. 17. 
76  See, e.g., Mikhail Sosnovskiy, On Nuclear Deterrence in Contemporary Circumstances; Sergei Sukhanov, Vladimir 
Grin’ko, The Strategy of Deterrence at the contemporary stage and the role of MSD in its implementation. 
77  Vladimir Verkhovtsev: Rossiya ne otkazhets’a ot takticheskogo yadernogo oruzhiya (Russia will not give up tactic-
al nuclear weapons), The Orthodox News Agency “Russkaya Liniya”, 31 October 2007: http://rusk.ru/ newsda-
ta.php?idar=173972 (13/08/2010). Verkhovtsev retired in December 2010. 
78  The former Head of the 12th GUMO General (ret.) Evgenii Maslin refers to the strong opposition from the 
Arzamas nuclear weapons manufacturing plant to the Global Zero for the simple reason that it wishes to remain in 
the business and continue receiving secure state funding. See: Nuclear arsenals in 25 years, in: Security Index 
(Moscow), Vol. 15, No 1 (86), Winter 2008/2009, p. 73. 
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existing status quo and the bureaucratic consensus based on the propositions of the defence and de-
fence-industrial establishments. 
Against this background, the few Russian non-governmental experts who develop options for TNW 
arms control almost never claim that such an agreement would be in Russia’s interest by minimiz-
ing the risks of the unauthorized use or theft of TNW, and/or by helping to overcome the legacy of 
confrontation with NATO. They rather claim that Moscow should be prepared to face increasing 
pressure from the US and NATO, in particular, which, at some point in time, may make the main-
tenance of the current rigid position no longer possible.79
 
 
 
TNW as part of a comprehensive arms control agenda 
 
Some relatively recent Russian statements admitting the possibility of including TNW on the 
agenda of the follow-on nuclear arms control negotiations80
By now, the pressure from the US Senate and the declared intention of the Obama administration to 
cover this class of weapons in the forthcoming round of talks may well have strengthened the ar-
gument that it would be difficult to keep this issue off the agenda. But even the most optimistic of-
ficial statements sound as if Moscow conceptualized potential TNW discussions as “talks about 
talks”
 raised expectations that Moscow’s pol-
icy may be undergoing a revision. In 2009, however, such statements merely served the purpose of 
preventing the integration of TNW into the New START talks. 
81
More recent statements indicate that Moscow has not abandoned its reluctant stance on TNW nego-
tiations. It continues putting forward preconditions it had formulated at an earlier stage and has ap-
parently even toughened its position after the ratification of the New START treaty by the US Sen-
ate. The initial preconditions included the following: 
 without prejudicing their outcome. 
 
– prohibiting nuclear states to deploy TNW beyond their national territory, i.e. withdrawing US 
nuclear assets from Europe, which, according to the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 
is seen as an “absolutely indispensable first step in any discussion of the issue”,82
– “fully and irreversibly” eliminating the entire infrastructure that can serve the purpose of de-
ploying US nuclear weapons in Europe
 and 
83
 
 including in the new NATO members – former War-
saw Pact countries and the Baltic States from which Soviet TNW have been withdrawn. 
In January 2011, while ratifying the New START treaty, the Russian State Duma reconfirmed both 
demands.84
The list of conditions seen as critical for Moscow to consider TNW reductions can be extended fur-
ther. It is the Russian defence establishment, in particular, that insists on including third nuclear 
powers in any TNW talks.
 
85
                                                     
79  Alexei Arbatov, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, p. 28. 
 While Russian foreign ministry officials used to refrain from referring 
80  Obsuzhdat’ s SShA yadernoe oruzhie nado posle peregovorov po PRO (Nuclear weapons should be discussed with 
the US after having negotiated ballistic defenses), RIA Novosti, 8 October 2009: http://rian.ru/politics/ 
20091008/188016463.html (14/07/2010). 
81  “Dialogue over the possibility of reducing tactical nuclear weapons”, to put it in the words of the former MFA 
spokesman Andrei Nesterenko. Ibid.. 
82  Yadernoe oruzhie ne dolzhno nakhodit’sya na territorii tret’ikh stran (Nuclear weapons should not be deployed on 
the territory of third countries), RIA Novosti, 26 March 2010: http://www.rian.ru/defense_safety/20100326/ 
216625933.html (13/08/2010). 
83  So the spokesman of the Russian foreign ministry Andrei Nesterenko on 5 February 2010: MID Rossii prizval vy-
vesti iz Evropy takticheskoe yadernoe oruzhie SShA (Russian MFA calls for withdrawal of US tactical weapons 
from Europe), http://www.glavred.com/archive/2010/02/05/013825-14.html (14/07/2010). 
84  25 yanvarya 2011 goda Gosduma ratifitsirovala Dogovor ob SNV (25 January 2001, the State Duma ratified the 
START Treaty), http://www.duma.gov.ru/news/273/62856/ (25/01/2011). 
85  Vladimir Verkhovtsev: Russia will not give up tactical nuclear weapons; Oruzhie umolchaniya (The silent wea-
pons), in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, 2 June 2010, http://www.ng.ru/editorial/2010-02-05/2_red.html 
(13/08/2010). 
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to this desire, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov surprisingly supported it in his press conference on 
13 January 2011.86
Furthermore, while the prospects for addressing TNW in arms control talks are widely associated 
with the follow-on negotiations to the New START treaty, Lavrov questioned the very rationale of 
beginning such negotiations any time before the treaty has been fully implemented,
 
87
This statement, which may appear surprising, reflects Moscow’s complex approach to the future of 
arms control. It seeks to integrate several issues which, until now, have been dealt with in a rather 
compartmentalized manner, or have not been properly addressed at all. 
 i.e. within 
seven years from its entry into force, or before 2018. 
While the preconditions and caveats above appear to justify the tactic of delaying discussions of 
TNW, as early as in March 2010 Foreign Minister Lavrov claimed that any TNW negotiations 
should be put into the wider context of a comprehensive arms control and disarmament agenda.88
This approach gradually matured in Russia from the late 1990s.
 
This implied that any further progress in nuclear arms control, including progress on TNW, is con-
sidered in Moscow in conjunction with progress in discussing other issues. 
89
From the 2000s, Moscow pursued a complex and extensive arms control agenda which included in 
particular: 
 The resulting consensus was 
based on the underlying assumption that further reduction of nuclear arms including TNW could 
put Russia’s national security in jeopardy if it was not accompanied by the inclusion of advanced 
non-nuclear weapons technologies in arms control arrangements. 
 
– banning weapons from outer space; 
– preventing the deployment of US ballistic missile defence and of new bases in Europe; 
– overhauling (modernizing) the CFE regime; 
– seeking to include advanced conventional weapons technologies, and particularly PGMs, the 
NATO Response Force and naval activities, under arms control and confidence- and security-
building measures, and, last but not least, 
– preventing the conversion of former US strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for conventional 
missions and the development of a Prompt Global Strike capability. 
 
TNW is not seen in Moscow as an isolated issue or a simple function of US-Russian arms control. 
It is rather perceived as one tile in the complex mosaic that is the comprehensive security environ-
ment in which Russia sees itself. Speaking at the second State Duma hearings on the ratification of 
the New START treaty on 14 January 2011, Lavrov made this way of thinking explicit by empha-
sizing that it is impossible to single out one issue – that of TNW – from the complex agenda of 
maintaining “strategic parity” without addressing such issues as the development of conventionally 
armed long-range strategic weapons systems, the weaponization of outer space, ballistic missile 
defences and the disparities in conventional forces.90
                                                     
86  Vystuplenie i otvety Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova na voprosy SMI na press-konferentsii po ito-
gam deyatel’nosti rossiiskoi diplomatii v 2010 godu (Statement by foreign minister S.V. Lavrov and answers to 
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87  Ibid. 
88  Nuclear weapons should not be deployed on the territory of third countries, RIA Novosti, 26 March 2010. 
89  See, e.g., Vladimir Belous, Anatolii Diakov et al. Sokrashchenie yadernogo oruzhiya. Protsess i problemy (Reduc-
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Consequences for arms control. 
 
1. Despite the ratification of the New START treaty, it shall not be taken for granted that it is going 
to be followed by another round of nuclear arms control negotiations between the US and Russia in 
the near future. Nor should it be taken for granted that Moscow would give its consent to begin ne-
gotiations with the objective of limiting and reducing TNW, particularly not before consultations 
within the NATO have produced a consensus on whether US TNW will be withdrawn from 
Europe, further reduced or remain. 
It is not unlikely, however, that the US and Russia will continue less formal consultations on all the 
issues that include TNW within the existing mechanism for discussing strategic issues in the con-
text of US-Russian relations or in another format. Those consultations would serve the purpose of 
identifying a complex agenda and architecture of future nuclear arms control negotiations, as well 
testing the two sides’ approaches to open issues, not least concerning the possibility of agreement 
on TNW. 
 
2. It should not be taken for granted that those consultations will be smooth and will yield tangible 
results any time soon. They will have to address current preconditions and they may be further 
complicated and delayed at any stage, not least by developments only indirectly related to TNW. 
Any discussion of approaches to a potential agreement on TNW will be affected by exhausting de-
bates over definitions and technical details before it can proceed to the core issues. 
There is no guarantee either that those negotiations would end with an agreement effectively allow-
ing for transparent and verifiable reductions of those weapons. Within seven years of the imple-
mentation of the last treaty, it appears unlikely that any consultations will lead to substantive pro-
gress. There is little or no room to expect TNW talks or consultations to proceed fast. 
 
3. A particular issue addressed in this section will be of particular importance for any consultations 
on TNW. That is the strong desire of the Russian defence establishment that those weapons should 
remain available for re-deployment regardless of where they are stored. This desire is reciprocated 
by the US, at least in part, which intends to keep its remaining TNW available for forward deploy-
ment, even if they are stored in the US, not least in order to reassure allies and/or to maintain the 
credibility of nuclear deterrence in the regional contexts. 
 
4. Progress across a wide range of arms control and other security-relevant political issues and con-
cerns raised by Moscow, including those related to more general questions of the European security 
architecture, would be an important element of any strategy of engaging Moscow and creating a 
more positive security environment as well as building trust and thus increasing the chances of 
TNW talks becoming a success story. 
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Part IV. Arms Control Options 
 
 
Any potential agreement on verifiable transparency measures (data exchange), limitations and re-
ductions (elimination) of TNW would differ significantly from other nuclear arms control regimes 
due to the former’s specificity. 
 
 
The specificity of TNW 
 
Any agreement on TNW would concentrate on warheads (weapons) instead of delivery systems 
since all platforms certified to deploy those weapons are of dual use and can carry both nuclear and 
conventional weapons. 
Previous nuclear arms control agreements avoided addressing the issue of warhead control. The 
START treaties relied on rather indirect methods of reducing deployed warheads by limiting or re-
ducing the relevant delivery systems. At the same time, they did not provide for either the elimina-
tion or monitoring of non-deployed warheads. There are only few exemptions from this pattern. 
The New START treaty, for instance, allows for the inspection of individual deployed missiles 
(one per inspection) in order to verify the declared number of re-entry vehicles they carry. How-
ever, this measure, yet to be tested, is of limited utility for TNW since it applies to deployed weap-
ons and not to those which have been separated from delivery systems. 
The 1987 INF Treaty was the first nuclear arms control instrument that provided for the elimination 
not only of the missiles but also of their front sections, including re-entry vehicles, which were 
crushed or flattened.91 The treaty established procedures for the observation of the destruction of 
warhead shells after nuclear devices and guidance elements had been removed.92
The 1992 agreement between Russia and Ukraine governing the transfer of nuclear munitions from 
the territory of Ukraine to temporary storage at disassembly plants in Russia allowed Ukrainian 
representatives to observe the disassembly and elimination of transferred nuclear warheads as well 
as the disposal of the fissile material which, under another agreement, was converted into fuel for 
Ukrainian nuclear power stations.
 Should any 
agreement on TNW provide for their verifiable elimination, the experience gathered through the 
implementation of the INF Treaty would provide a solid basis for the relevant procedures. 
93
While they are of some utility, previous nuclear arms control agreements do not provide a blueprint 
of how to proceed with TNW. Any new instrument addressing the issue would have to elaborate a 
new set of procedures if the agreed limitations and/or reductions were to be verifiable. 
 
Such measures would have to be extremely intrusive and are seen by either side as very sensitive. 
Under the PNIs, no TNW are operationally deployed. This means that, in contrast to strategic arms 
subject to the START treaties, they are kept in depots separate from their platforms. This makes 
their status similar to that of the non-deployed strategic warheads kept in reserve, which are neither 
accounted for under the New START treaty, nor subject to verification. 
The precise location of warheads – whether in storage or transit – cannot be monitored by national 
technical means. For this reason, any verifiable TNW agreement would require inspections of: 
                                                     
91  Protocol on procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate-range and 
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– nuclear weapons storage facilities, both at military bases and central locations, 
– the movement of warheads in and out, as well as between the relevant nuclear sites, and 
– temporary depots at nuclear weapons production (assembly/disassembly) plants. 
 
Russia and the US have not gone that far in their previous agreements, but have instead proceeded 
on the basis that the disclosure of the locations of nuclear sites, or of the presence of nuclear weap-
ons at specific locations was too sensitive, not to speak of the intrusive inspection of such locations. 
Remarkable progress was achieved during the 1990s while implementing the US-Russian Coopera-
tive Threat Reduction program which included a set of cooperative measures aimed at upgrading 
the security status of Russian nuclear weapon storage facilities. The underlying presumption re-
mains, however, that the US and Russia have not yet reached the level of mutual trust that would 
allow them to agree on such a set of highly intrusive measures as outlined above, let alone to grant 
other nuclear powers access to the relevant information and particularly to nuclear sites. 
 
 
The general framework 
 
While Russia remains hesitant on the issue of a potential TNW agreement, the US Government has 
revealed the main features of its future approach. This sets the stage for the time to come, making 
the discussion of alternative formats for negotiations less relevant, particularly as Moscow has not 
proposed any vision of TNW arms control of its own. 
Firstly, the US intends to include TNW on the agenda of the next round of bilateral negotiations 
with Russia. At this stage, the US does not intend to engage third nuclear powers. 
Secondly, the particular objectives of the US remain ambiguous and comparably moderate. Secre-
tary of State Clinton emphasized that the US would “seek Russian agreement to increase transpar-
ency” on TNW in Europe,” and “relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO mem-
bers”.94
In its Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START treaty, the Senate went 
a step further by suggesting that, in the anticipated negotiations, the US should seek an agreement 
“to address the disparity” between the TNW stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United 
States “and to secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner”
 
95
At the same time, the Senate emphasized the importance not only of negotiating verifiable reduc-
tions of TNW but also of improving the security and transparency of existing stockpiles by “estab-
lishing cooperative measures to give each Party to the New START treaty improved confidence re-
garding the accurate accounting and security of tactical nuclear weapons maintained by the other 
Party”.
 (emphasis 
added). 
96
Thirdly, at a relatively early stage, the Obama administration took a decision on the method by 
which it will seek to address the issue. The 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review envisaged combining 
the negotiations over non-deployed strategic weapons and those concerning TNW (also non-
deployed), thus making the reduction of US strategic weapons in reserve conditional upon the re-
duction of the stockpile of Russian TNW.
 
97
Although the US Government has not yet presented a detailed proposal to this effect, the US arms 
control community anticipates that it may seek to complement limits on strategic delivery vehicles 
and deployed strategic weapons with a single limit on all US and Russian nuclear warheads – de-
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ployed and non-deployed, strategic and tactical. An overall limit would leave each party the flexi-
bility to decide on the particular mix of weapons it holds in reserve.98
This approach seeks to exploit the Russian preoccupation with the large number of US strategic 
warheads in reserve. At the same time, the US does not seek linking the reduction of TNW to either 
the modernization of the CFE regime or the withdrawal of the US nuclear assets from Europe, as 
suggested by numerous experts.
 
99
Indeed, it seeks to offer stronger incentives to Moscow, which reveals no interest in a deal involv-
ing a few hundreds of American and several thousands of Russian TNW. Such an asymmetric trade 
off is rejected in Moscow. The Russian demand that the US withdraws its nuclear assets from 
Europe prior to TNW talks serves precisely the purpose of preventing any consideration of such a 
deal.
 
100
The modernization of the CFE regime would be seen as an important step in response to Moscow’s 
concerns but not sufficient compensation for the inclusion of Russian TNW under an arms control 
regime. As discussed in the second and third sections of this study, the Russian defence and politi-
cal establishment is concerned not only with NATO’s numerical superiority in the area of heavy 
weapons covered by the CFE regime. It is more concerned with the growing superiority of the US 
and NATO in advanced weapons technologies. This significantly expands the number of areas in 
which the US and NATO are expected to compensate Moscow for its cooperativeness on TNW. 
 
Fourthly, as, even according to the most optimistic view, US-Russian follow-up talks are unlikely 
to open any time soon, and since the inclusion of TNW on the agenda of those talks would depend, 
not least, on the progress and outcome of consultations within NATO concerning the possible 
withdrawal of American TNW from Europe, the US Government is likely to explore a phased ap-
proach that seeks to improve transparency regarding the size, location and deployment status of 
TNW as well as their security before a formal agreement is reached.101
The US proceeds on the assumption that each party would gain from such an approach by offering 
Moscow several incentives. It presumes that further reductions of strategic nuclear arms, which are 
supposed to be in the Russian interest, are unlikely if TNW is not addressed.
 It would probably also ex-
plore the feasibility of other early measures, such as establishing exclusion zones. 
102
The issue thus boils down to two main questions: will Moscow 
 At the same time, it 
would grant Moscow transparency and some control over the non-deployed US strategic weapons 
which, for a long time, has been subject of Russian concern. 
 
– accept the link between its TNW and further reductions of strategic arms as well as the US 
strategic warheads in reserve, and 
– agree to take early measures, particularly those increasing transparency and/or introducing 
geographic restrictions regarding the storage of those weapons, before a more comprehensive 
agreement with the US has been reached? 
 
The Russian debate over TNW does not provide any clearly affirmative responses to either of those 
questions. 
Should Moscow agree to include TNW in any arms control regime, a bilateral instrument negoti-
ated with the US is considered to be the most appropriate first step to deal with the issue,103
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the insistence of the Russian defence establishment on including third parties’ nuclear forces in the 
arrangement. 
It is not unlikely that Moscow will continue reducing its TNW, since Russian stockpiles, as re-
viewed in the first section of this study, apparently exceed the requirements of the “nuclear de-
escalation” doctrine considered in the second section. However, Moscow still has the choice of 
whether to continue to reduce TNW as part of an agreement with the US or unilaterally. Opting for 
the latter would leave Russia more freedom of action, while limiting this freedom does not offer 
sufficient benefits. Up to now Moscow has preferred to maintain its freedom of action. 
The interest of Russia in further reductions of strategic nuclear arms is often overestimated. The 
Russian establishment proceeds on the basis that the New START treaty is the best possible nego-
tiable deal and sets an acceptable framework for the US-Russian “strategic stability equation” for 
the next ten years.104 At the same time, anticipated uncertainties regarding the transformation of the 
security landscape beyond the New START time horizon make Moscow hesitant to predict how 
this equation could look like ten years from now. For this reason, it hesitates to enter a commitment 
to any further reductions any time soon. These hesitations manifested themselves in Lavrov’s 
doubts regarding the advisability of launching any new negotiations before the New START treaty 
is fully implemented.105
The major source of current concern remains the evolution of the US ballistic missile defence pol-
icy. The New START lifetime nearly coincides with the first phase of the current planning for de-
ploying US ballistic missile defence systems in Europe. The latter is considered less problematic in 
Moscow now that it has been revised by the Obama administration. However, should the next 
phase anticipate the deployment of silo-based interceptor missiles, Moscow might feel forced to 
reconsider its policy and refrain from further reductions of its nuclear arsenal below the New 
START provisions. 
 
The US Senate resolution on the ratification of the treaty, which emphasizes the understanding that 
the US is not restricted by the New START provisions, in any way, in deploying ballistic missile 
defence systems or in developing new conventionally armed weapons systems of strategic impor-
tance, has only strengthened Moscow’s concerns and hesitation as regards follow-up steps. 
The attractiveness of the proposal to grant Moscow control over non-deployed strategic weapons 
at the price of subjecting its TNW to an arms control regime also appears to be overestimated. The 
main cause of concerns expressed by the Russian defence establishment is not the total number of 
weapons the US holds in reserve or the possibility of monitoring their state but, rather, the “spare 
capacity” of US strategic delivery vehicles allowing the deployment of additional warheads and 
thus increasing the operationally deployable strategic capability of the US. The New START treaty 
has limited the US upload capability to about 100 “spare” delivery vehicles, thus reducing it to a 
level relatively acceptable to the Russian defence establishment.106
Should Moscow seek to further reduce the upload capability of the US strategic forces, it will most 
likely concentrate on additional reductions of delivery vehicles rather than warheads in reserve. 
Thus the added value of a trade-off between non-deployed strategic weapons and TNW is not ob-
vious for Moscow either. 
 
The hesitations of the defence establishment may eventually be outweighed in Moscow by political 
considerations, i.e. the interest to maintain the recent positive dynamics in relations with the US. 
Arms control negotiations are traditionally seen in Russia as the most natural tool for engaging the 
US. 
                                                     
104  On this see: SNV podpisan – chto dal’she? (START is signed – what is next?). A roundtable discussion in: Index 
Bezopasnosti, Issue 4, 2010, pp. 105 – 112. See particularly deliberations by General Buzhinskiy, former Head of 
the International Treaties Department of the Russian MoD, pp.106, 107, 109. 
105  Statement by foreign minister S.V. Lavrov and answers to questions from mass media in a press conference on the 
record of the activities of the Russian diplomacy in 2010, Moscow, 13 January 2011. 
106  General Buzhinskiy called the respective provisions of the New START Treaty a “partial solution” although not the 
ultimate one. Ibid., p. 110. 
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However, here again voices urging caution are strong,107
The plausible conclusion from this argument is that further nuclear arms control consultations are 
seen in Moscow as an important means of continuous communication on strategic issues with the 
US. However, any Russian government is likely to commit itself to further steps, including on 
TNW, after it has a better idea of what the US policy on arms control, ballistic missile defence and 
the development of the conventional Prompt Global Strike capability is going to be after the New 
START treaty expires. 
 as negotiations in the remaining few years 
of the Obama administration are not expected to yield tangible results or a breakthrough, while 
there is a great deal of uncertainty about what policy Obama’s eventual successor may pursue. Re-
gardless of whether the succession takes place two or six years from now, the most important deci-
sions defining the future US posture, e.g. on ballistic missile defence, will be taken by another 
president. 
As long as the consultations proceed, early measures, for instance those on improving transparency 
on TNW stockpiles, may well be the subject of US-Russian deliberations. The added value of such 
measures for Russia, however, is not obvious, since they would require Moscow to commit itself to 
particular actions while it would have to wait for any benefit from them – if any was forthcoming – 
until after an agreement had been reached. 
Thus the balance sheet of the current arms control offer by the US is at best ambiguous from the 
Russian perspective. At the same time, the constituencies with a vested interest in maintaining the 
status quo on TNW, as discussed in the third section of this study, have powerful arguments to 
prove that any early progress in dealing with those weapons would unilaterally disadvantage the 
Russian Federation. 
 
 
Transparency and confidence-building measures 
 
The need to arrange for the confidential exchange of data on the quantity, storage locations and the 
deployment status of TNW is a sine qua non of any negotiations, particularly since knowledge re-
garding this class of weapons remains inconclusive and unreliable. The first package of transpar-
ency measures could anticipate the declaration, by each side, of their existing stockpiles as well of 
the respective storage locations. An exchange of data of this kind is sometimes considered helpful 
even if it precedes the negotiation of a full-scale legally binding and verifiable treaty.108
While representing a welcome first step to building confidence between the parties, the practical 
utility of an early set of transparency measures as applied to TNW would be limited for several rea-
sons. 
 
Firstly, it would depend on the agreed definitions and the common categorization of TNW setting 
the parameters for both the data exchange and the elaboration of further arms control and verifica-
tion measures. 
As referred in the first section, there is no commonly accepted definition of TNW (e.g. based on 
range, yield, missions or other criteria) except for the one that includes in this category every single 
nuclear weapon not yet covered by existing nuclear arms control instruments. Before applying any 
transparency measures, it would be particularly useful to agree on the categorization of the de-
ployment status of TNW (e.g. active non-deployed, deployable in reserve, or non-deployable await-
ing disassembly) and to agree which categories would be covered by what transparency measures. 
Some experts suggest, for instance, that the initial data exchange should not include information on 
the entire TNW stockpile but only on those weapons stored at air and naval bases, i.e. on active 
                                                     
107  Ibid, p. 109. 
108  See, e.g., Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) 
Nuclear Weapons in Europe, p. 33-34. 
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non-deployed weapons, excluding deployable weapons held in central reserve or awaiting disas-
sembly.109
The negotiations over the relevant definitions and categories are supposed to be the first part of the 
TNW negotiations proper, and not the easiest part. Since the American approach foresees negotiat-
ing with regard to the entire stockpile of non-deployed warheads, both strategic and tactical, it is 
legitimate to ask whether the US would be prepared to include data on its reserve strategic weapons 
in the data exchange. 
 
Since the structure of data exchange is expected to be first defined and agreed in negotiations, it is 
unlikely that a properly conclusive and comprehensive exchange of information will precede the 
TNW talks proper . Indeed, Moscow is reportedly reluctant to engage in data exchange on TNW 
prior to the beginning of official negotiations.110
Secondly, on its own, data exchange, although welcome and helpful as a first step, would be con-
sidered inconclusive and not fully reliable if not supported by the appropriate verification meas-
ures. This is a reason why many experts do not separate the transparency issue from that of verifi-
cation. However, it is unlikely that an appropriate package of verification measures could be devel-
oped before negotiations were considerably advanced. Given the sensitivity of the issue and other 
difficulties associated with designing appropriate measures, any verification mechanism is likely to 
result from the TNW talks rather than precede them. It is, moreover, more likely than not that any 
verification measure adopted would be imperfect.
 
111
The parties will thus have to decide whether they are prepared to engage in unverifiable data ex-
change at the beginning of the talks, or would rather wait until an imperfect verification regime is 
established at the end of the talks. 
 
The most elaborate proposal concerning how the data exchange on TNW could be organized in 
conjunction with forthcoming verification measures was submitted several years ago by a group of 
Russian experts from the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Mos-
cow Institute of Physics and Technology.112
Firstly, Russia and the US would declare the quantity of operationally deployable TNW (active 
non-deployed as well as deployable weapons in central storage) and their locations. They would 
commit themselves not to convert weapons that had been retired back into deployable weapons, 
and would provide each other with data on the number of weapons destroyed on the basis of PNIs 
since 1991 and on of all nuclear weapons destroyed since 1992. They would also exchange infor-
mation and discuss with each other their nuclear postures involving TNW. 
 They suggested that a relevant set of transparency 
measures could be implemented in two steps. 
Secondly, they would allow visits to storage facilities for deployable weapons in order to provide 
reassurances that their quantity did not exceed the declared numbers. They would provide each 
other with evidence of the destruction of the weapons retired at the first stage, and would allow vis-
its to storage facilities for weapons awaiting disassembly once all weapons retired during the first 
phase had been destroyed. 
The parties also could significantly improve mutual confidence in their knowledge about each 
other’s arsenals of TNW if they agreed to share and were able to sufficiently verify information on 
their annual production and elimination of nuclear weapons thus allowing, at least over some time, 
for a more precise assessment of their actual holdings.113
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110  Vladimir Rybachenkov, On prospects of the US-Russian disarmament dialogue, December 1, 2010, pp. 1-2. The 
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111  Steven Pifer, The Next Round: the United States and Nuclear Arms Reductions After New START, p. 32. 
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113  Steven Pifer, The Next Round: the United States and Nuclear Arms Reductions After New START, p. 32. 
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As a gesture of goodwill, parties could consider implementing the first step of data exchange before 
or at an early stage of any forthcoming TNW talks. By contrast, transparency measures involving 
any sort of verification will only be feasible after the negotiations are completed. 
The only instrument that appears to provide a basis for early, if limited information exchange be-
tween the US and Russia on the status of their TNW without waiting for the beginning or comple-
tion of formal talks are the PNIs. 
Although the PNIs represent unilateral and not legally binding commitments, in the 1990s, the US 
and Russia used to update each other on their implementation, as referred to in the first section of 
this study. As a demonstration of goodwill, they could agree to resume the exchange of information 
based on the definitions of the PNIs. They could also potentially extend this exchange beyond dis-
cussing simply the implementation of the PNIs to include data on current holdings and the status of 
the warheads concerned as well as on destroyed weapons. 
The PNI-related discussion could also provide a platform for launching a dialogue on the US and 
Russia’s TNW postures, including their plans on how to further proceed with the existing stock-
piles. 
Since TNW are seen as an issue of political concern not only in the US but also in some European 
countries – some of which are NATO members and some not – it would be desirable to give those 
countries some reasonable reassurance that, while discussing the issue on a bilateral basis, the US 
and Russia do not neglect their concerns. 
The resumption of the information exchange on TNW in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), as 
practised in the former NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council until 1999, could probably serve 
this purpose in the best possible way. The NRC would provide an appropriate platform for such an 
exchange, not least because it could also serve the purpose of updating Moscow on the progress of 
intra-NATO consultations concerning the possible withdrawal of US nuclear assets from Europe. 
Looking forward and preparing the ground for an agreement on TNW, the NRC could also be in-
strumental in addressing, in a multilateral format, issues concerning the security of nuclear weap-
ons, transparency and mutual confidence-building by developing cooperative joint measures. As 
suggested by Sam Nunn, this would require no new treaty or formal agreement.114
 
 
 
Consolidation of TNW in central storage facilities 
 
As concluded in the first section of this study, the introduction of specific geographic nuclear “ex-
clusion zones”, which, as anticipated by the new NATO strategic concept of November 2010, or by 
proposals made by Poland, Sweden and the US, would keep storage facilities for Russian TNW 
away from the NATO-Russia border, appears impractical for various reasons. 
It is not clear how far Moscow would be supposed to move its weapons in order to keep them 
away, in a reassuring manner, from the territory of NATO and EU member states. TNW delivery 
systems have various ranges; some of them are able to reach EU/NATO territory from well beyond 
the Urals. Apart from this, most TNW delivery systems are mobile and can be forward deployed 
regardless of where they are usually deployed and where the relevant munitions are stored. 
All or most of Russian TNW are reportedly kept, together with strategic weapons, in central stor-
age facilities controlled by the Ministry of Defence rather than at air or naval bases. Many of those 
facilities are reportedly located close to EU/NATO borders. This makes the introduction of “exclu-
sion zones” unverifiable unless all Russian nuclear storage facilities are moved to the Far Eastern 
part of Russia. 
                                                     
114  I.e. a joint terrorist threat assessment to security of nuclear weapons, joint NATO-Russia recovery exercises, or at 
least symbolic mutual visits to nuclear bases where nuclear weapons are stored. See: Sam Nunn, NATO, Nuclear 
Security and the Terrorist Threat, in New York Times, 16 November 2010, available at: http://www.nytimes. 
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Needless to say, a demand to move all Russian TNW sufficiently away from the borders of 
EU/NATO countries that did not even touch on the issue of US and other NATO countries’ TNW 
in Europe is unlikely to be appreciated in Moscow. 
An alternative approach focuses on reducing the availability of TNW instead of the geography of 
their storage locations. As suggested by a number of experts,115
Implementing such a measure would effectively imply the withdrawal of some 200 US nuclear 
gravity bombs from Europe, while Russia would move about 500 gravity bombs and ASWs (and, 
presumably, naval TNW) to central storage. 
 the US and Russia could commit 
themselves to not keep their TNW together with operational units, i.e. not to store those weapons at 
forward-based locations at air and/or naval bases near the respective delivery systems (or to with-
draw them if currently so stored). Instead, they would move such weapons to “deployable re-
serves”, i.e. consolidate them at central storage facilities. 
The implementation of such measures would be easier to verify through inspection of operational 
general purpose air and naval base storage facilities. Instead of verifying the correctness of the de-
clared number of warheads kept at a site, as well as their types, the purpose of such inspections 
would be to reaffirm that no nuclear weapons are kept at operational bases. 
Of course, this measure would have limited utility as it would not provide any responses to ques-
tions relating to stockpiles of TNW. Nor would it necessarily significantly increase the time needed 
for operational deployment of Russian TNW, since “central” storage facilities are often located in 
the proximity of the operational bases and differ from the latter mainly in terms of command struc-
tures. 
However, as an early step to be implemented before TNW talks have been launched or completed, 
it could have an important political confidence-building and reassuring effect. The consolidation of 
all non-deployed weapons in presumably more secure central storage facilities would certainly 
make them less vulnerable to theft or unauthorized use while, at the same time, preserving the pos-
sibility of returning some weapons – potentially subject to prior notification – to the operational 
bases in case of a contingency – an option which is considered important by the Russian – and 
probably also the US – defence establishment.116
 
 
 
Verification 
 
While contemporary political and military posture constraints make the rationale of an agreement 
on TNW questionable from the Russian perspective, it is verification of such an agreement that is 
going to be the major challenge. Measures to control non-deployed nuclear warheads and/or weap-
ons-grade fissile material were not anticipated by any US-Russian nuclear arms control treaty until 
they agreed, in 1994, to explore possible guarantees of the transparency and irreversibility of nu-
clear disarmament. These included exchange of information on nuclear warheads and fissile mate-
rial, selective verification of this information, and the elaboration of non-intrusive measures to con-
trol and verify the elimination of nuclear warheads. 
While the US initially envisaged that such an agreement was to cover all nuclear warheads in their 
various states as well as fissile material, upon the request of Russia, the elaboration of the relevant 
measures was restricted to those designed to apply only to excessive weapons and fissile material, 
i.e. to weapons being retired under arms control agreements, and not to those kept in storage. 
It is important to note that, on launching this initiative, Russia and the US envisaged extending the 
application of the anticipated methods to both strategic and tactical nuclear munitions, particularly 
since the latter were supposed to be covered by the START 3 treaty, which never was negotiated. 
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In 1994-1998, in an activity prepared jointly by Russian and American nuclear scientists, which 
became known as a Lab-to-Lab Program, significant progress was achieved in developing methods 
allowing each side to follow, in a reassuring way, the whole process from taking nuclear weapons 
to be retired either off their delivery vehicles or from storage facilities, transporting them to tempo-
rary depots at a disassembly site, to actual destruction of the weapons and the disposal of the fissile 
material without disclosing the most sensitive engineering or technological information.117
Although the Lab-to-Lab Program was interrupted in 1998, shortly before entering the final stage, 
its participants reached two important conclusions – apart from many practical findings. 
 
Firstly, they believed they had proved the feasibility of the methods developed for the purpose of 
controlling warheads and fissile material. Those methods were designed to complement traditional 
nuclear arms control measures, which concentrate on delivery vehicles rather than munitions. 
Secondly, being well aware of the sensitivity of the subject and the need to protect the relevant in-
formation, they came to the conclusion that the methods developed would only work in an envi-
ronment characterized by a high level of mutual trust between the partners in cooperation. Suffice it 
to say that the work of the joint group from nuclear labs of the two countries mandated by two joint 
decisions of their presidents was interrupted in 1998 upon the intervention of the Russian Federal 
Security Service and was never resumed. 
Two other findings stemming from joint work carried out by American and Russian scientists in 
the late 1990s are relevant for the purposes of this study. 
The methods they developed are generally applicable to both strategic weapons and TNW. Al-
though the experiments of the scientists were reduced to the verification of the elimination of ex-
cessive warheads, their results are in principle applicable to the verification of nuclear warheads in 
storage facilities and of those being transported from one nuclear site to another. 
Still, the subject itself and the methods developed were considered so sensitive that, at least in the 
initial period of application, both the US and the Russian Federation would hesitate to share them 
with third countries. I. e., should TNW negotiations start and draw on the findings from the Lab-to-
Lab Program, they are most likely to be limited to the US and Russia while leaving the possibility 
that other nuclear powers join the process at a later stage. 
The US-Russian Lab-to-Lab was not the only project that explored options for the verifiable elimi-
nation of nuclear warheads. A series of other international projects, involving, for instance, the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency and the UK and Norway, which were implemented during the 
1990s and thereafter, provides evidence of the feasibility of identifying a proper set of methods to 
allow for sufficiently reassuring monitoring and verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons 
by means of a nuclear arms control agreement without revealing the most sensitive weapons-
engineering information.118
This implies that the verifiable reduction of TNW is possible in principle and is mainly prevented 
by broader political considerations and the lack of trust that increases hesitation regarding the co-
operative engagement in this rather sensitive area. 
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Consequences for arms control 
 
1. Should the most optimistic scenario materialize and TNW talks begin, the most feasible format 
for them would be bilateral US-Russian negotiations. Any multilateralization of talks to include 
third parties, at least in the initial phase until the first agreement is tested, would unnecessarily 
complicate the sharing of sensitive information and methods designed to exercise control over nu-
clear weapons rather than delivery vehicles. 
This makes the suggestion that non-deployed strategic weapons and TNW be included on the 
agenda of the US-Russian New START follow-on negotiations appear to be an elegant solution, 
although it has yet to be accepted by Russia. 
While anticipating acceptance of this by Russia, it is important to note that the incentives for Rus-
sia to address the TNW issue, particularly alongside further cuts in strategic arms and non-
deployed US strategic warheads should not be overestimated. In order to convince Moscow, the US 
would be better advised to engage Russia on a wide range of other relevant issues across a broad 
arms control agenda, such as the revitalization of the CFE regime, ballistic missile defence or long-
range conventionally armed precision-guided munitions. This would provide reassurance that it 
takes arms control seriously and that the interest in arms control can be sustained across changing 
US administrations. 
 
2. Any negotiation of verifiable TNW limitations and reductions is likely to be an extremely chal-
lenging task and a lengthy process. Anticipating a time-consuming negotiation process, not only 
the parties to the talks (the US and Russia) but also concerned European states might explore the 
feasibility of early measures to improve transparency and build confidence in order to gradually es-
tablish an atmosphere conducive to a satisfactory outcome of the talks. 
It is largely a matter of goodwill for Russia and the US to declare the quantity of deployable TNW 
in their reserves and to exchange data on the number of tactical weapons destroyed on the basis of 
PNIs since 1991 and of all nuclear weapons destroyed since 1992 without waiting for the beginning 
of official talks or for any progress to be made in them. However, every data exchange should be 
preceded by the elaboration of commonly agreed definitions and categories structuring TNW by 
type and deployment status. 
 
3. One way of providing greater transparency on this class of weapons would be for the US and 
Russia to resume exchanges on the implementation of the PNIs. In parallel to this bilateral ex-
change, the NATO-Russia Council may provide, as it did for some time in the 1990s, an important 
platform for mutually reassuring TNW consultations to allow for reasonable confidential data ex-
change; discussion of TNW postures; updating Russia on the intra-NATO consultations concerning 
the future of the US nuclear assets in Europe. These consultations also could help facilitating coop-
erative NATO-Russia confidence-building measures. 
 
4. While the introduction of nuclear exclusion zones appears a rather impractical measure, removal 
or reduction of TNW from/in forward air and naval bases to central storage facilities could be a 
helpful and reassuring first step. Although it would not necessarily mean that all such weapons are 
moved “deep into national territory”, such a measure could help further reducing the risks of theft 
or unauthorized use of TNW. 
 
5. The next round of US-Russian nuclear arms talks, which is still waiting for Russian consent, will 
possibly combine the discussion of TNW and non-deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Reliable 
verification of any agreement to limit or reduce both types of weapons would pose the major chal-
lenge during those negotiations. The relevant arrangements, however, can build upon the joint find-
ings of the US and Russian nuclear scientists who, between 1995 and 1998, developed non-
intrusive methods allowing the observation, in a reassuring manner, of the dismantlement, storage, 
transportation and disassembly of nuclear warheads as well as the disposal of fissile material from 
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them. Such arrangements can also benefit from the broader international experience in monitoring 
the disassembly of nuclear warheads. 
 
6. Any agreement on the application of those methods in a very sensitive area of the military or 
military-relevant nuclear infrastructure will be impossible without the restoration of mutual trust 
between Russia and the US as well as between Russia and the Transatlantic community of states 
and institutions, NATO included. Restoring and promoting mutual trust would necessitate progress 
not only across the broader arms control agenda but also in the discussion of wider political issues 
raised by Moscow, such as President Medvedev’s initiative to consolidate and ratify a new Euro-
pean security order to be based on the mutual recognition of the political status quo and the institu-
tionalization of a trilateral consultative process to involve Russia, the US and the European Union 
in preparing the most important decisions affecting the European security landscape. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
1. Over the past twenty years, the Russian Federation has significantly reduced its arsenal of de-
ployable and non-deployable TNW from around 22,000 to about 5,000 or 6,000 on the basis of uni-
lateral US-Soviet/Russian Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992. While large parts of 
this arsenal have been destroyed, all remaining TNW are reported to have been moved to storage 
facilities, so that neither Russia nor the US now operationally deploy any such weapons. 
However, Russia still maintains a far more sizable TNW arsenal than the US. Although little is 
known about actual numbers, breakdown by various criteria or deployment status, it is expected to 
be further reduced on the basis of either unilateral measures or by agreement, as it apparently ex-
ceeds the requirements of the Russian military doctrine and particularly those of the nuclear de-
escalation posture. 
 
2. Despite the ratification of the New START treaty, prospects for US-Russian talks on TNW re-
main vague, not least due to the Moscow’s withholding of consent and the lack of consensus within 
NATO on the future of the US TNW in Europe. Even if these obstacles were to be overcome, the 
talks would be extremely complicated and unlikely to yield tangible results any time soon. 
This is due to two reasons – political- and defence-posture-related hesitations particularly on the 
Russian side, which tends to increasingly rely on its nuclear arms in defence planning, and the 
specificity of the subject of forthcoming talks, which would have to concentrate on the very sensi-
tive issue of controlling non-deployed nuclear munitions in storage facilities instead of deployed 
weapons systems. 
 
3. Confronted with the decline of its conventional forces and a growing gap in advanced military 
capabilities, Russia is increasingly relying on nuclear arms to offset its growing inferiority vis-à-vis 
advanced military powers, particularly the US. 
As a result, Russia and the US find themselves on different trajectories as regards their definitions 
of the future role of nuclear arms in their postures. While the US anticipates that the ongoing de-
velopment of its conventional capabilities would lead to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons, it 
is precisely the advance of US non-nuclear capabilities that represents the major source of concern 
for the Russian defence establishment and causes it to project a growing role for nuclear weapons 
in the future. 
 
4. While considering nuclear disarmament, Moscow no longer concentrates only on the “nuclear” 
balance with the US or third nuclear powers but tends to include in the strategic equation advanced 
military capabilities such as precision-guided munitions, ballistic missile defence, long range con-
ventionally armed weapons that can be assigned to strategic missions, and the potential weaponiza-
tion of outer space. 
Since it appears unlikely that Russia will be able match any of these developments any time soon, it 
seeks to compensate for its weakness in virtually every area by the reliance on nuclear weapons, 
assigning its various classes of nuclear weapons multiple roles in virtually any sort of contingency. 
This thinking became deeply rooted in the Russian defence and nuclear defence-industrial estab-
lishments early in the 1990s. Ever since, they have constituted a powerful lobby for the mainte-
nance of a sizable nuclear capability and have sought to win acceptance of their views in the politi-
cal establishment. The 1999 Kosovo air campaign, the 2003 war on Iraq, and the 2008 Russo-
Georgian war proved extremely conducive to anchoring this thinking among the Russian political 
establishment. 
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The strong resistance to applying arms control measures to TNW is therefore most likely to be bro-
ken from outside the Russian Federation if Moscow is engaged over time by those external partners 
that have the expressed interest in limiting and reducing TNW. 
 
5. Should the most optimistic scenario materialize and TNW talks open, they would be bilateral 
US-Russian negotiations that would not involve any third parties, at least not in the early stages. In 
these talks, the US would seek to link START-type reductions of deployed strategic delivery vehi-
cles and warheads with limitations and reductions of non-deployed weapons – both strategic and 
tactical. 
This approach appears promising and more appealing for Russia than linking reductions of its 
TNW with the prospect of withdrawing a few hundred US nuclear weapons from Europe or that of 
overhauling the CFE regime. It offers Russia the benefit of further and deeper reductions of strate-
gic nuclear arms as well as that of extending arms control measures to cover the non-deployed US 
strategic nuclear warheads. 
The value of those benefits for Russia should not be overestimated, however. Russia has recog-
nized the reluctance of the US to accept any restrictions on future phased deployments of its ballis-
tic defence systems in Europe as well as on the development of conventionally armed systems that 
can be assigned strategic goals. The Russian establishment is therefore hesitant to commit itself to 
any particular further steps towards nuclear disarmament and seeks to keep all options for the 
maintenance and development of Russian nuclear capabilities open. 
If it wants to convince Moscow, the US would be better advised to engage Russia on a wide range 
of non-nuclear arms control issues, such as the modernization of the CFE regime, ballistic missile 
defence or long-range conventionally armed precision-guided munitions. This would provide reas-
surance that it takes arms control seriously and that the interest in arms control can be sustained 
across changing US administrations. 
 
6. Any negotiation over verifiable TNW limitations and reductions is going to be a challenging task 
and a lengthy process. Particularly since, in order to be verifiable, such measures would require the 
introduction of extremely intrusive and sensitive inspections of nuclear sites. 
Anticipating time-consuming talks, the US and Russia, as well as the concerned European states, 
might explore the feasibility of applying a gradualist approach and of taking early measures to im-
prove transparency and build confidence in order to facilitate the establishment of a more condu-
cive atmosphere for the negotiation of a viable TNW agreement. 
 
– It is largely a matter of goodwill for Russia and the US to disclose the quantity of deployable 
TNW and strategic weapons in their reserves and exchange information on the number of 
TNW destroyed on the basis of the PNIs as well as of all nuclear weapons destroyed during 
the past twenty years without waiting for the beginning of or progress in official talks. 
 
– One way of providing greater transparency on the status of this class of weapons would be for 
the US and Russia to resume exchanges on the implementation of the PNIs even without for-
mal negotiations. 
 
– Parallel to this bilateral exchange, the NATO-Russia Council may provide another platform 
for multilateral consultations on TNW to allow for reasonable confidential data exchange; dis-
cussion of nuclear postures; updating Russia on the intra-NATO consultations concerning the 
future of the US nuclear assets in Europe. Such consultations could also facilitate cooperative 
NATO-Russia confidence-building. 
 
– At the same time, measures based on geography, such as the introduction of “exclusion 
zones”, in which TNW should be neither deployed nor stored, appear rather impractical. 
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It is not clear how far Moscow would have to move its weapons in order to keep them away, 
in a reassuring manner, from the territory of NATO and EU member states. TNW delivery 
systems have a variety of ranges, and some of them are able to reach EU/NATO territory from 
well beyond the Urals. Most TNW delivery systems are mobile and can be forward deployed 
regardless of where they are usually deployed and where the relevant munitions are stored. 
All or most of Russia’s TNW are reportedly kept together with strategic weapons in central 
storage facilities, i.e. in depots controlled by the Ministry of Defence rather than at air or naval 
bases. Many of these facilities are reportedly located near to the borders of EU/NATO coun-
tries. This makes the introduction of “exclusion zones” unverifiable unless all Russian nuclear 
storage facilities are moved to the Far Eastern part of Russia. 
Needless to say that a demand that all Russian TNW be moved sufficiently far from 
EU/NATO borders that does not even touch on the issue of US and other NATO countries 
TNW in Europe is unlikely to be appreciated in Moscow. 
 
– For this reason, consolidating TNW in central storage facilities regardless of their geographic 
location can provide an alternative interim solution to the introduction of “exclusion zones”. A 
measure of this kind would also further reduce the risks of theft or unauthorized use of those 
weapons. 
 
– Otherwise, the US-Russian talks seeking to limit and reduce non-deployed strategic weapons 
and TNW could build upon the joint findings of the US and Russian nuclear scientists who, 
between 1994 and 1998, developed non-intrusive methods that allow the observation, in a re-
assuring way, of the dismantlement, storage, transportation and disassembly of nuclear war-
heads as well as the disposal of fissile material from them. 
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Abbreviations 
 
 
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile 
ASM Air-to-Surface Missile 
CFE Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey (California) 
EU European Union 
12th GUMO 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation 
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles) 
MoD Ministry of Defence 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NRC NATO-Russia Council 
NRDC National Resources Defense Council 
PGM Precision-Guided Munitions 
PNIs Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
SDRA Swedish Defence Research Agency 
SLCM Sea-Launched Cruise Missile 
START Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction and Limitation Treaty 
TNW Tactical (or Non-Strategic, or Sub-Strategic) Nuclear Weapons 
UK United Kingdom 
UNO United Nations Organization 
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